التقرير الدوري لمراكز الابحاث الاميركية 23/2/2018
نشرة دورية تصدر عن مركز الدراسات الأميركية والعربية
23 شباط - فبراير/ 2018
المقدمة
تصدرت حادثة أطلاق النار داخل مدرسة ثانوية في ولاية فلوريدا التغطية الإعلامية ومراكز الأبحاث، على السواء؛ ومضى بعض المراكز في استعراض وتحليل إسقاط سوريا لطائرة مقاتلة "اسرائيلية،" من طراز إف-16، وتداعياتها المقبلة.
يتناول قسم التحليل حادثة الإعتداء المسلح داخل مدرسة، على الرغم من أنها ليست الحادثة الأولى باستهداف مدارس ومقتل عشرات الطلبة، وتجدد الدعوة لتشديد القيود على إقتناء السلاح. الخلاصة المرئية ان مصير أي قانون جديد للحد من "سهولة شراء قطع سلاح،" في ظل انتشار "معارض السلاح" بكثرة، لن يكون أفضل حالً مما سبقه من مساعي سرعان ما تتلاشى بعد هدوء العاصفة الإعلامية، وذلك لقوة نفوذ لوبي السلاح وتخاذل الحزبين المهيمنين على السلطات الأميركية.
ملخص دراسات واصدارات مراكز الابحاث
سوريا:
اعتبر معهد واشنطن لسياسات الشرق الأدنى اسقاط سوريا مقاتلة "اسرائيلية" متطورة، إف-16، أمراً "في غاية الأهمية .. واختباراً للخطوط الحمراء الأميركية والإسرائيلية في سوريا؛ (واكبه) إطلاق سوريا صواريخ أرض-جو؛ سقط عدد منها في شمال إسرائيل مما أدى إلى إطلاق أجهزة إنذار الدفاع المدني." وأضاف أن "دورة التصعيد .. شهدت إطلاق سوريا ما يزيد عن عشرين صاروخاً من طراز "سام" SA-3, SA-5, SA-6, SA-17” . وأردف متهماً "حرس الثورة الأيرانية وقوفه وراء العمليتين الاستفزازيتين الأخيرتين .. اللتين وقعتا على خلفية الثقة الأيرانية المتزايدة بأن التدخل في سوريا قد أنقذ نظام الأسد، وحدّ من انتشار القوات الأميركية شمال شرق البلاد؛ وسمح لطهران بإنشاء قاعدة للعمليات الموجهة ضد إسرائيل." ومضى المعهد بالقول أن "المواجهتين الأخيرتين تثيران أسئلة ملحة حول تحركات إيران المقبلة ودور روسيا المحتمل." وختم بالقول أنه يتعين على الولايات المتحدة "إبلاغ روسيا بأنها ستدافع بقوة عن مصالحها في سوريا .. والعمل سوياً على إعادة تنشيط الجهود الديبلوماسية، وتجنب تورط البلدين في مواجهة خطيرة."
The past week has witnessed two significant incidents involving lethal U.S. and Israeli airpower inside Syria. Each came in response to apparent tests by Syrian, Iranian, and Russian forces, and more such tests are probably in the offing.
PROBING ISRAEL
On February 10, an aircraft that appeared to be an Iranian Simorgh-type drone made a predawn incursion into northeastern Israel. According to Israeli military sources, the drone was piloted from an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) mobile ground-control station located at Syria's Tiyas air base near Palmyra. After an incursion lasting about ninety seconds, the drone was downed by an Israel Defense Forces Apache helicopter over the Beit Shean Valley. The IDF then scrambled eight F-16I jets to strike the Tiyas base.
In response, Syria fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) at the jets, including some that landed in northern Israel and triggered civil defense alarms. One of the F-16s was apparently downed by an SA-5 missile after failing to take proper evasive action while assessing damage to its targets; the two pilots ejected inside Israel.
The cycle of escalation soon continued when the IDF hit twelve target complexes inside Syria, including air defenses near Damascus and Deraa as well as three military sites where Iranian headquarters were present: Tal al-Mane, Dimas, and Tal Abu al-Thaalab. Altogether, Syria may have fired more than twenty SAMs, including SA-3s, SA-5s, SA-6s, and SA-17s. There is no evidence yet that Russian-operated missiles or radars assisted in the F-16 shootdown.
PRESSURING U.S. PARTNERS
On the night of February 7, a column of Iranian-led units fired artillery in the direction of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) south of Deir al-Zour, eight kilometers east of the Euphrates River deconfliction line established by Washington and Moscow. The column then advanced on the SDF position and the adjacent Tabiyah Gazirah oil fields, led by T-72 and T-55 tanks. According to a variety of social media and news reports, the force of around 500 troops included Afghan fighters from the IRGC-led militia Liwa Fatemiyoun; local Arab tribal auxiliaries recently recruited to the militia Liwa al-Baqir, led by Iranian officers; fighters from the Assad regime's National Defense Forces (NDF); along with Russian-equipped "Daesh hunter" auxiliary troops and Russian private military contractors from the Wagner Group.
U.S. airpower and artillery destroyed the attacking force, killing around a hundred personnel, including an estimated thirty NDF troops, forty other Syrians, and thirty Russian contractors (though some media reports claim the latter number was much larger, probably because they are counting Russian-equipped Syrians). Around twenty vehicles were also destroyed, including nine tanks. The U.S. military used overwhelming firepower to send a strong message, including F-15 and F-22 fighters, an AC-130 gunship, Apache helicopters, and Marine Corps artillery.
THE IRGC'S CALCULUS
The IRGC appears to have spearheaded both of these recent provocations, in line with its long track record of conducting drone operations inside Syria and its leading role in coordinating the Assad regime's offensive operations south of Deir al-Zour. The question is how the two tests are related, if at all.
One thing is clear: both incidents occurred against a background of growing Iranian confidence that the Syria intervention has saved the Assad regime, limited the United States to a tenuous foothold in the northeast, and allowed Tehran to establish a forward base of operations against Israel. The IRGC is now able to collect intelligence on Israel directly, reinforce and resupply Hezbollah by land, and potentially transform the Golan Heights into an active military front.
Moreover, while Syrian and Hezbollah drones have flown over Israel in the past, this is the first known incursion by an Iranian drone. The craft apparently entered Israeli airspace via northwest Jordan, perhaps to achieve surprise, create ambiguity about its point of origin, complicate Israel's response, and test Israeli defenses there. The fact that it was downed so quickly indicates that it was probably tracked prior to entering Israel, and that it lacked many of the stealth features of the American drone on which it was supposedly based (i.e., an RQ-170 captured by Iran in 2011). Technical exploitation of the wreckage will presumably clear up certain questions about the drone's mission and whether it was armed. Whatever the case, the incident demonstrates that Iran is now willing and able to use Syria as a base for operations inside Israel, marking a new phase in tensions between the two adversaries.
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Both of the recent confrontations raise pressing questions about Iran's next moves and Russia's potential role:
Why did Iran undertake the drone mission? If the goal was intelligence gathering, Tehran could have deployed smaller drones of the type Hezbollah has already used to penetrate Israeli airspace. Instead it apparently chose an untested system, the Simorgh. Perhaps Israel's failure to down an intruding Hezbollah drone in July 2016 led IRGC officials to believe that a "stealthy" Simorgh could operate unhindered, especially with the element of surprise. They may also have been motivated to try it as a way of scoring propaganda points after the Deir al-Zour setback. At any rate, the drone appeared to fly at an altitude that would be considered unusually low for either a reconnaissance or strike mission.
Is Iran showing an increased propensity for risk taking? Although Tehran may have believed that the drone would proceed undetected, the operation was quite risky and unusual given the well-worn IRGC strategy of relying on proxies. How will the IDF strikes—which reportedly killed a number of Iranian personnel—affect Iran's risk-taking behavior in the future? And why did Hezbollah not respond on behalf of its patron?
In the past, Iran has often backed down when countered robustly, only to renew the challenge at a different place and time, sometimes with different means. The loss of Iranian personnel has opened a new blood account that the IRGC may seek to settle at a later date—though Hezbollah likely prefers to avoid escalation on Lebanon's border right now in light of the country's forthcoming elections. Despite domestic criticism of foreign entanglements during Iran's recent protests, the IRGC does not appear any less willing to intervene abroad.
What is Moscow's calculus? The Kremlin likely understood that Russian contract fighters were being used in the Deir al-Zour operation. Yet the Israeli Air Force chief of staff has said that Moscow was not involved in the drone incident, and that Russian authorities were informed at some point about Israel's retaliatory operations. Even so, Iran may have (mis)calculated that the presence of Russians in the Deir al-Zour probe and at Tiyas would deter Washington and Israel from responding.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the likelihood that Iran will continue testing American and Israeli redlines in Syria, the Trump administration should pursue a more coherent approach that includes the following measures:
Build on the credibility gained at Deir al-Zour by policing U.S. redlines more consistently. The United States might consider resuming strikes in response to future chemical weapons incidents; these could justifiably be broadened to include nearby Iranian or proxy elements supporting Assad regime forces. Moreover, strikes on high-value Iranian targets not directly connected to such provocations would further complicate Iran's calculations and make U.S. strikes less predictable.
Prepare for an indirect challenge to the U.S. presence in SDF areas. This may include Iranian pressure on Iraq to close down the U.S. supply line across the Tigris River. Beyond supporting moderate forces in Baghdad, Washington needs to establish a Turkish option for sustaining its presence in Syria, assuring Ankara that it will restrain the Kurdish elements that lead the SDF and press them to break ties with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
Support the southwestern opposition enclave in Deraa province. The IRGC and its allies may probe this area on the Jordanian border next, aiming to split it in two. The United States should therefore execute a limited, covert train-and-equip program for non-Salafist rebel groups there and elsewhere in Syria, as part of a wider effort to tie pro-regime elements down and limit their ability to make trouble for U.S. forces or neighboring states.
Reassure allies. This means continuing to support vigorous Israeli responses when Iran or Hezbollah challenge its sovereignty or security, and helping Jordan secure its airspace against Iranian incursions.
Publicly lay out the consequences of escalation. Washington should make clear that if Iranian forces or their proxies open a wider conflict with Israel, they might emerge so weakened as to jeopardize their hard-won gains against rebel forces in Syria.
Signal Russia that the United States will actively defend its interests in Syria. At the same time, Washington should work with Moscow on reenergizing diplomatic efforts to manage the Syria conflict and avoid embroiling the two countries in a dangerous confrontation of their own.
سخر معهد كاتو من مزاعم الولايات المتحدة بأن هجومها على قوات "موالية للحكومة السورية،" قبل أسابيع قليلة، يندرج تحت بند "الدفاع عن النفس،" قائلا "دفاعاً عن أي نفس .. إذ لم نلمس قيام نظام بشار الأسد بقصف ميناء بوسطن" مثلاً. وأضاف أن الجيش السوري بالمقابل "شن هجوماً على قاعدة سيطر عليها المسلحون السوريون منذ زمن، تواجد داخلها مستشارون عسكريون أميركيون." وأوضح أن الإدارة الأميركية حسمت أمرها لتواجد قواتها في سوريا "لأجل غير مسمى .. وتواجدها بكل تأكيد لم يأتِ بناءً على طلب الحكومة المضيفة؛ بل لم يصادق الكونغرس على نشرها بأي صيغة كانت."
America’s Creeping Regime Change in Syria
By John Glaser
This article appeared on the American Conservative on February 14, 2018.
In eastern Syria last week, American air and ground forces attacked Syrian pro-government military units, killing roughly 100 people, including some Russian advisors. U.S. Army Colonel Thomas Veale described the attack as “taken in self-defense.”
“Self-defense”? Had the regime of Bashar al-Assad bombarded Boston Harbor? No, but it had attacked a base, long held by Syrian rebels, with U.S. military advisors present. Despite the tit-for-tat chronology here, it’s hard to see how Veale’s “self-defense” claim is tenable.
After all, as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson explained last month, the Trump administration has committed to an indefinite military presence of roughly 2,000 U.S. boots on the Syrian battlefield. Are these troops present at the behest of the host government? Certainly not. Has Congress ratified their deployment in some way? Guess again. Are they there preempting an imminent threat of attack on America? Nope. Are they under the mandate of a UN Security Council resolution? No.
And you thought our government toppling days were over.
In fact, the U.S. military presence in Syria has no legal authorization whatsoever. Those American forces are cooperating with Syrian rebels to, as Tillerson put it, “help liberated peoples” in territory outside Assad’s control “stabilize their own communities” and defend themselves against regime forces. This is, he added, “a critical step to creating the conditions for a post-Assad political settlement.”
Dispensing with the euphemistic flummery, U.S. forces are engaged in a kind of creeping regime change operation — the lessons of recent history be damned.
One might fairly argue that the Assad regime, in its brutality against its own people, long ago forfeited the sovereign right to defend its territory against an invading foreign army. Fine, but we should be clear that Washington, in responding to the lawlessness, is also acting lawlessly — hardly a lodestar mission of the liberal, rules-based world order America claims to lead, and, in the big picture, decidedly not a case of “self-defense.”
Quaint legalisms aside, the clash between U.S. and Syrian forces should make clear just how dangerous our military presence in Syria is. This particular incident, we can reasonably assume, didn’t escalate only because the regime is desperate to avoid escalation. Were they to counterattack, the Syrians surely know, the full might of America would come crashing down upon Damascus, and that would be the end of them all.
But that is by no means a reassuring “balance of terror,” the term nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter used to describe the deterrence model of the Cold War’s mutually assured destruction. Indeed, the multi-sided chaos of the Syrian Civil War is neither balanced nor stable and the risk of escalation is very real. Should the actors in the next clash miscalculate, will the Russians defend their ally in Damascus before it falls, or will America’s “self-defense” spiral into the destruction of the regime? Will the resulting anarchy plunge us into a full-scale occupation? Will Turkey take advantage of the mayhem to rampage through Kurdish-held Syria? Will Iranian-backed militias still prioritize fighting Sunni extremist groups? If anything could reverse the defeat of the Islamic State, it is an escalation like this.
As with much of American foreign policy today, the threat to the United States in Syria is roughly proportional to the extent to which we choose to expose ourselves to it. None of the five missions Tillerson laid out for the U.S. military effort in Syria — to defeat ISIS and al-Qaeda, usher in a post-Assad state, counter Iranian influence, facilitate the return of refugees, and free Syria of weapons of mass destruction — are vital to protect America’s wealth and physical security.
Nor are these low-cost, low-risk, or high-probability-success missions. And as everyone knows, the last thing America needs now is a new set of elective, hazardous, and unachievable war aims on the other side of the globe.
America has an interest in a stable Middle East, and thus in a stable Syria, but the notion that U.S. policy has contributed to that end is rather dubious. The Islamic State, which exacerbated the Syrian Civil War by orders of magnitude, is, after all, an outgrowth of America’s war in Iraq. And the U.S. and its allies encouraged the Syrian rebellion from early on, an effort that was not only a spectacular failure but also fostered quite the opposite of stability.
An enduring feature of U.S. foreign policy is that each intervention, whether it is seen to fail or succeed, eventually serves to justify further intervention. While it’s true that the Islamic State has been decimated, thanks in part to the collective destructive power of Damascus, Tehran, Baghdad, Moscow, Washington, and various Kurdish and Syrian militias on the ground, it has been accomplished at great cost in blood and treasure. The answer to this near-Pyrrhic victory is not for Washington to invent new missions that lack legal authorization or a plausible timeline of success, but instead to reckon with its own role in this interminable tempest and acknowledge the very real possibility that backing away may be in the best interest of America and of Syria.
استعادت مؤسسة هاريتاج السردية الرسمية حول إيران ووجودها في سوريا بأنه "يهدد الإقليم." وفي الدلائل أشارت المؤسسة إلى "مصادر إسرائيلية .. بأن طائرة الدرونز الإيرانية هي عبارة عن نسخة تمت هندستها عكسياً عن الطراز الأميركي RQ-170" والتي أسقطتها إيران داخل أجوائها عام 2011. وأضافت بأن "رسالة إسرائيل لكل من سوريا وإيران .. لن تصبر على التهديد المتنامي لإيران من سوريا."
Iran’s Moves in Syria Threaten Region
Hard to believe it’s even possible, but the Middle East got more troublesome over the weekend with the Israel Defense Forces’ shoot-down of an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle — a UAV, or “drone” — which violated Israeli airspace.
Israeli forces not only destroyed the Syria-based drone, they also reportedly launched a series of stinging air strikes against as many as a dozen Syrian and Iranian targets across the border in Syria.
According to Israel, the drone is a reverse-engineered copy of the stealthy U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel UAV lost over Iran in 2011. And though the immediate mission of the Iranian drone isn’t publicly known, Israel’s signal to Syria and Iran is quite clear.
That is: It won’t brook a growing Iranian threat from Syria.
Israel’s concern is well-founded. Iran could very well be setting up shop in Syria as the security situation there turns decidedly from dealing with ISIS to determining who will dominate this strategic Middle Eastern country.
Iran, understandably, wants to be the key outside power player in Syria.
For the mullahs, Syria is a fundamental building block — in addition to Iraq and Lebanon — in Tehran’s plans to cobble together a swath of power across the Middle East, spanning from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea.
Of course, as its closest ally, Tehran has long had clout in Damascus. But the Syrian regime’s indebtedness to the Iranian theocracy for rescuing it from the dustbin of history during the ongoing civil war runs deep.
The payback to Tehran could come in a persistent Iranian military presence in Syria. As it does in the real estate business, “location, location, location” also counts in security issues — big time.
Indeed, Iran would be able to project power against Israel from just across the Syrian border courtesy of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Quds force, offensive weapons and intelligence capabilities.
Having Iran in Syria also endangers neighboring Lebanon — the home of Tehran’s terror ally, Hezbollah. Iran could more efficiently and effectively support the terror group’s effort to dominate the country as well as threaten Israel to the South.
Think of it: The mullah’s missiles on the Mediterranean.
While seemingly running against the grain of Iran’s modern strategic culture for basing its forces abroad, the prospect of Tehran militarizing parts of Syria or Lebanon long-term is deeply alarming — to say the least.
Indeed, a quick look at the map shows that, if successful, Iran would have influence over of a big chunk of the Middle East, allowing Shiite, Persian Iran to threaten more Sunni Arab states and nearly encircle American ally, Israel.
There’s no question this isn’t good for U.S. interests either, but especially with U.S. forces deployed across the Middle East on counterterrorism missions; Iran is no fan of the United States.
Of course, the bloody, nearly 7-year-old Syrian civil war is probably far from over — not to mention that other major powers such as Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United States have a say in Syria’s future.
But considering this weekend’s drone incursion, it could be just the opening salvo of conflicts to come from an emboldened Tehran — meaning now would be a good time to assemble a coalition to pre-empt Iranian expansionism.
الرئيسية 
البوابة 
