كيف تحطم العراق وما السبيل للتحرر؟

كيف تحطم العراق وما السبيل للتحرر؟

البروفيسور كمال مجيد
في الآونة الاخيرة تم نشر الرسائل المتبادلة، قبل احتلال العراق سنة 2003 ، بين ديك تشيني، نائب رئيس الجمهورية في الولايات المتحدة وطارق عزيز، وزير الخارجية العراقي حينذاك. ركز طارق عزيز وهو يعاتب امريكا على نقطتين: في الاولى انه يشير الى قيام حزب البعث العراقي وامريكا بمحاربة الشيوعية في العراق بنجاح منذ ايام عبدالكريم قاسم. وفي الثانية انه يركز على تعاون الطرفين في الحرب ضد ايران منذ 1980 وحتى النهاية.
ان محاولة الشك في الرسائل لا تكذّب الحقائق المدونة ادناه. سأشرح باختصار، النتائج الكارثية لهذا التعاون وكيف تمكن العدو الامريكي واعوانه المحليون من تحطيم العراق واعادته الى الوراء لاكثر من قرن على الأقل، حيث فقدت الحكومة تأثيرها على الخلافات المذهبية والعنصرية والعشائرية والفئوية. بهذا الخصوص كتب السيد اسعد عبدالله علي في “رأي اليوم” الغراء في 7/5/2003 يقول: ((عقد التسعينات شهد ولادة المهن المنحرفة في العراق, نتيجة ضعف القانون وانحسار سلطة الدولة… التي كانت تحكم بالحديد والنار ضربتها الحرب الكونية ثم الحصار العالمي …وبعد 2003 حيث زالت الدولة البعثية، لتتشكل دولة بنظام مختلف، ظاهره الحرية والديمقراطية، وباطنه فوضى مخيفة مع تغييب غريب لسلطة القانون … ))
ان محاربة الشيوعية، بعد ثورة 14 تموز 195، شملت ايضا ً محاولة اغتيال الزعيم الوطني عبد الكريم فاسم واغتيال المئات من مؤيديه. لقد خلق حزب البعث المناطق المغلقة سنة 1959 لاعضائه ومؤيديه، كمنطقة الاعظمية والجعيفر، وتهجير المعارضين لسياسته منها، الامر الذي هزّمني وعائلتي بسرعة مخيفة من الصليخ الى الكرادة، مع رشق سيارتي بالحجارة.
تغيرت الامور في انقلاب سباط 1963 الدموي بصورة مخيفة. اذ تم قتل عبدالكريم قاسم وعشرات من ضباطه امام عدسات التلفزيون. مع اعلان الحكم العسكري ومنع التجول تم سجن عشرات الالوف وقتل ما لا يقل عن 5000 من خيرة العراقيين، معظمهم مات تحت التعذيب في قصر التهاية. كان بينهم عدد كبير من السياسيين والكتاب والاطباء والمهندسين من امثال سلام عادل وحسن سريع والكاتب البارع عبد الجبار وهبي، ابو سعيد، وبينهم اصدقائي في الدراسة مثل حسين هورماني وعبد الخالق البياتي ومعروف وحسين برزنجي وجبار بيروزخان والدكتور عدنان البراك وعضو الهيئة المؤسسة لحزب التحرر الوطني حسين ابو العيس وعبدالرحيم شريف، احد قادة حزب الشعب ..
في 1977 اخبرني مسعود بارزاني (( تغير السياسة الامريكية سنة 1975 بعد اجتماع سري جرى بين هنري كيسنجر وصدام حسين. )) وذلك بالرغم من انقطاع العلاقات الدبلوماسية بين الدولتين منذ 1967. كان ذلك تحضيرا ً لنشوب الحرب العراقية الايرانية لقتل ما لايقل عن نصف مليون من شعبنا المسكين بالاسلحة الامريكية،، بينها الكيمياوية منها كما في حلبجة، وبأموال عربية، مسلمة، من اثرياء الخليج وحكام الخليج.

للتفصيل راجع:

US Chemical and Biological Warfare – Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, Senate Committee on Reports of 25/5/1994 and 7.10/1994.

دفعت امريكا حكومة البعث عمدا ً لاحتلال الكويت بغية اشراك الجيش العراقي في حرب خاسرة لتحطيم ما تبقى من الاسلحة العراقية التي اشتراها العراق من امريكا واوروبا اثناء الحرب مع ايران (للتفاصيل راجع كمال مجيد، النفط والاكراد، منشورات دار الحكمة، لندن، 1997.)
بمناسبة اعلان الانتصار صرح القائد الامريكي شوارسكوف بابادة 41 فرقة عسكرية عراقية، اي اكثر من 300 الف عراقي بين قتيل وجريح ومفقود او مدفون في الحفر المسماة بالمقابر الجماعية . حول هذه الجرائم كتب باتريك سلويان يقول: ((والطريقة الاخرى للقتل كانت استعمال مكائن نقل التراب والجرافات المنصوبة على الدبابات والتي نتجت عن دفن الالوف من الجنود العراقيين وهم احياء… ولم يمت جندي امريكي واحد خلال عملية الهجوم.))
راجع

(Patrick Sloyan, Iraq Troops Buried Alive Says American Officers, The Guardian,,13/9/1991 )

لقد قصفت الطائرات الامريكية دون رحمة ملجأ العامرية لقتل 540 مدنيا ً من الاطفال والنساء. واقتصاديا ً تم قصف معظم المعامل، واحدة لتصفية وتعبئة حليب الاطفال في ابو غريب، كنت قد اشرفت على بنائها، اضافة ً لتدمير العشرات من الجسور ومحطات الصرف الصحي ومحطات الكهرباء العملاقة في دبس وبغداد والناصرية والبصرة.
ثم قتل العدو الامريكي اكثر من 560 الف طفل عراقي في الحصار الاقتصادي وذلك باعتراف وزيرة الخارجية، مادلين اولبرايت.
استمر القتل في حرب الاحتلال وبعد الاحتلال، بمشاركة الاحزاب الاسلامية مثل حزب الدعوة ومجلس الحكيم الاسلامي الاعلى ، في تلعفر والفلوجة ومدينة الثورة والنجف والبصرة والقائم وعشرات اخرى من المدن والقصبات. لقد خرب العدو الامريكي المحتل حارضنا وحضارتنا واشرف جنوده المنتشرون في شوارعنا على
فرهود تراثنا من متحفنا ومكتبتنا الوطنيتين وفرهود الدوائر الحكومية، عدا وزارة النفط.
لقد اعتدى العدو بصورة مخجلة على عرضنا وشرفنا في ابوغريب واستخدم العتاد المغطاة باليورانيوم بحجة نشر الديمقراطية الفاسدة منها، لقتل وتشويه الاجنة في بطون امهاتنا في الفلوجة والبصرة. لقد دخل الجنود الامريكان حتى في غرف نوم نسائنا لتفتيش ملابسهن الداخلية بحجة العثور على الاسلحة المحرمة. هكذا، باختصار، تحطم عراقنا!
هذه الجرائم البشعة غير الانسانية لم يرتكبها ابدا ً سوى الامريكان. فتأريخهم يثبت انهم اختصوا في القتل منذ حروب ((االكاوبوي)) ضد هنود الحمر وفي 280 حربا ً في العالم. انهم يقتلون حتى بعضهم البعض! ففي 27/4/2021 نقل مراسل البي بي سي، مستغربا ً، خبر ((مقتل 13000 مدني امريكي في الاشهر الثلاثة الاولى من هذه السنة وحدها.)) هذه هي حقيقة الديمقراطية التي ادعوا نشرها في العراق منذ احتلاله سنة 2003.
اذا ً من واجب الشعب العراقي اولا ً وقبل كل شيء التركيز على الجهاد للتحرر من هذا العدو وديمقراطيته المخيفة.
كعراقيين، علينا ان ندرك أن الولايات المتحدة كدولة استعمارية كبرى استغلت قابلياتها العسكرية واموال واراضي الدول العربية في الخليج للسيطرة على بلادنا وتفتيتها الى مكونات متخاصمة. الامر الذي فسح المجال للصهاينة الاسرائيليين للسفر الى المنطقة الكردية للسياحة والتجارة وحتى لشراء الاراضي، في حين لا يستطيع العراقي من الجنوب دخول المنطقة دون تزكية. ان شعبنا العراقي الصغير لا يستطيع حماية نفسه دون توحيد جهود كل المخلصين من مختلف المكونات ودون التحالف مع الشعوب المجاورة المنكوبة مثلنا.
لهذا بالضبط تم تقسيم شعبنا عنصريا ً ومذهبيا ً وتوجيهه ضد جارتنا ايران، المعرضة للحصار الامريكي القاتل، وتشويه سمعتها بل وسمعة المليشيات العراقية واللبنانية والفلسطينية البطلة واتهامها بالارهاب ، كما تعمل امريكا واسرائيل ليلا ً نهارا ً. ان هذا التصرف يزيد من آلام شعبنا المنكوب بالاحتلال. هناك الضرورة الملحة لنبذ الخطط الامريكية التي تدفعنا للهجوم على جارتينا في سوريا وايران و المنكوبتين مثلنا بالاحتلال والحصار الاقتصادي. بدل اشغالنا بهذا الهجوم هناك الآن الضرورة القصوى لانهاء الخلافات القائمة بين ابناء الشعب الواحد والتي تعمقت نتيجة الدستور المكوناتي.
هناك ايضا ً الضرورة القصوى لتنظيم الشعب بقيادة الكوادر القديرة من كل الاطياف، تلك التي تستطيع مجابهة السلطات وقهرها وهذا لا يتم دون وجود منظمة وطنية تؤمن بوحدة الشعب العراقي وبمساواة العرب والاكراد والتركمان والكلدو آشوريين والارمن. منظمة تشمل المسلمين والمسيحيين والصابئة واليزيديين. نحن العراقيون نحتاج الى نبذ الخلافات التي ورثناها من الحرب العراقية الايرانية التي خططها هنري كيسنغر ومولها شيوخ الخليج الذين يتسارعون الآن للاعتراف باسرائيل. اننا بحاجة الى فكر جديد وعمل جديد ضد الطائفية وضد الانحياز القومي والديني ومنع تقسيم الشعب الى “الاكثرية” و”الاقلية” واحتكار قمة الحكم بواحدة منها. فالنسيج العراقي المتعدد يرفض بشدة سيطرة كتلة انعزالية عليه بحجة سمو دينها او قوميتها. ان الادعاء بكون العرب او الشيعة هم الاكثرية فلهم حق قيادة الحكومة او الادعاء بأن للاكراد حق الانفصال او حتى الفيدرالية ادعاءات مفرقة في بلد مثل العراق وقد تم الاثبات على ضررها و فشلها. علينا التمسك بقانون ((العراقيون متساوون في كل الحقوق والواجبات!)).
ان امكانية النجاح في ثورتنا في تحسن مستمر فامريكا منشقة على نفسها ولهذا كتب توماس فريدمان في نيويورك تايمز في 6/5/2021 يقول (( نحن لسنا بخير. لا تزال ديمقراطية امريكا في خطر حقيقي. في الواقع نحن اقرب الى حرب اهلية سياسية
أكثر من أي وقت آخر في تاريخنا الحديث. ))
وهناك ايضا ً تحسن في العلاقات السعودية- السورية – الايرانية والذي يساعد شعبنا في الاعتماد على مساندة الاشقاء المجاورة لنا. وداخليا ً انفضح فساد الحكومات العميلة المصابة بالانعزال بعد الضحايا التي قدمها شعبنا في الثورة الامريكية الملونة في تشرين 2019. فلنتحد لانقاذ كل الشعب من الجحيم الذي يعيشه. ولنوحد كل من يمكن توحيده داخل العراق وفي المنطقة لتحقيق التحرر. ولنرفع شعار ((على صخرة الاتحاد الكردي العربي يتحطم الاستعمار الامريكي واذنابه! ))
كاتب عراقي

[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 146 (Saturday, October 8, 1994)]

[House]

[Page H]

From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[Congressional Record: October 8, 1994]

From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF IRAQI CHEMICAL AGENTS DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. President, on several previous occasions, I have made

public important findings on the probable causes of the serious medical

problems facing gulf war veterans called gulf war syndrome.

The evidence available continues to mount indicating that exposure to

biological and chemical weapons is one cause of these illnesses.

The Department of Defense steadfastly refuses to acknowledge this

aspect of the problem. Their blanket denials are not credible. Recent

American history provides grievous examples of official military cover-

ups and Defense Department mistakes--the poisoning of countless

thousands of Vietnam veterans by agent orange is just one compelling

example.

To my mind, there is no more serious crime than an official military

cover-up of facts that could prevent more effective diagnosis and

treatment of sick U.S. veterans.

Today, I will present additional evidence to show that despite

repeated automatic denials by the Department of Defense, chemical

weapons and chemicals agents were present and found in the war zone.

First, we now have a British report and a U.S. Army report which

document in detail the discovery of more than 250 gallons of dangerous

chemical agents. According to the military units that were actually

there it was mustard gas and another blister agent.

Second, we have evidence of an Army sergeant, who received official

Defense Department awards and commendations for injuries from chemical

weapons in the Kuwaiti theater of operations that the Pentagon now says

did not exist. It is an astonishing example of the lengths the Defense

Department is going in order to deny reality.

Lastly, we have received the laboratory findings from a gas mask, its

case, and filter, taken from the gulf war battlefield that reveals the

presence of fragments of biological materials that cause illnesses

similar to gulf war syndrome.

british and united states army reports

We now have British and United States Army reports that document the

presence of chemical agents in Kuwait--well inside the Kuwaiti theater

of operations--well inside areas occupied by United States and British

forces. They had been placed there by Iraqi forces during the

occupation of Kuwait. The liquid was tested, and over 20 times the

presence of chemical agents was confirmed.

In this specific case, chemical specialists from the British Army

using a chemical agent monitor, M18A2 chemical agent detector, and

detector paper--chemical specialists from the United States Army using

a chemical agent monitor, detector paper, and two mass spectrometers,

detected chemical mustard agent.

Further, two sophisticated fox chemical detection vehicles' mass

spectrometers also identified the presence of phosgene oxime. This was

a direct sample--not random vapors collected by the vehicle--as in

previously reported cases.

A British soldier who came into contact with the liquid blistered

immediately and appeared to be going into shock--as might be predicted

from the nature of the agents present.

The tapes were ordered removed from the vehicle and to be sent

forward along with a sample of the chemical agents. The soldiers were

ordered to give the materials to individuals in unmarked uniforms--

unmarked uniforms. Earlier this year, Captain Johnson after hearing

that the Department of Defense was denying the presence of chemical

agents in Kuwait--forwarded the report on this incident through his

chain of command. But the report was returned to him and not forwarded

to the Department of Defense.

The Kuwaiti, United States, and British Governments all received

reports on this discovery and recovery of bulk chemical agents.

The Department of the Army originally told my staff that prior to

releasing Captain Johnson's report they must obtain clearance from the

Department of Defense, and that an intelligence review must be

conducted. That would seem to contradict their claim that there is no

classified information on this subject. They claimed that prior to

releasing the British report, they had to get the permission of the

British. However, when I received the British report, it was dated July

14, 1994, indicating that it had been prepared in response to my

request, in coordination with the Department of Defense. This official

dissembling and effort to obscure the facts are a continuation of

Defense Department tactics we have seen before on this issue. The

serious question remains as to why we were not provided with an

official report dating from the time of the incident by the Department

of Defense.

A July 14, 1994, report prepared by the British Chemical and

Biological Defense Establishment claimed that ``in their view'' the

substance was fuming nitric acid.

But we now have a copy of the British report prepared by the unit

actually present at the event, written 3 years earlier on August 8,

1991. I had to find this report myself. It confirms that mustard agent

was detected, and that the substance was oily, like mustard agent.

Nitric acid is not oily. In my view, this is an important example of a

pattern of deliberate misrepresentation of the truth. It is an

appalling record.

The U.S. report confirms that not only was mustard agent detected in

the container using a mass spectrometer, but also in microdoses on the

ground. This would appear to eliminate the possible explanation that

the container held fuming nitric acid--rocket fuel oxidizer--so

concentrated that it reacted with materials in the mass spectrometer

causing false readings when the material was examined. The mass

spectrometers in both fox vehicles were also successfully calibrated

before and after this detection event.

There is also the issue of how the Department of Defense has handled

the investigations into reported chemical agent detection events. We

continue to receive reports from individuals, many of whom are no

longer in the military--who have been contacted by high ranking

military officers assigned to work with the Defense Science Board Task

Force investigating this issue. We have receive complaints from

veterans that rather than trying to seek other witnesses or corroborate

their reports, these officers have called to convince them that they

were mistaken--that their individual experiences and findings were not

credible--and that their statements made to Congress would be refuted.

Most recently, an individual associated with this original detection of

chemical agents in the war zone was contacted by one of these officers.

This officer specifically told the individual that these findings would

be refuted by the Department of Defense--even before the Department

received the report from the British that was eventually forwarded to

me.

I ask my colleagues here in the Senate to evaluate these reports only

on their merits; 21 field tests conducted on this substance were

positive for mustard agent; both United States and British chemical

agent monitor readings confirmed eight bars for mustard gas, a maximum

reading indicating the presence of highly concentrated agent; eight of

eight mobile mass spectrometer tests, using two separate Fox vehicles

and liquid agent in a controlled setting identified identical

substances--mustard agent, and phosgene oxime; it was the same color as

mustard agent; it was oily like mustard agent; a mobile mass

spectrometer reading indicated that microdoses of mustard agent were

present in the soil; a British soldier suffered a chemical injury

consistent with what would be expected when exposed to these agents,

particularly to phosgene oxime; and a Department of Defense explanation

described by the National Institute for Standards and Technology

variously as ``high unlikely,'' ``no likelihood,'' and ``not

possible.''

ARMY SERGEANT'S ``MYSTERY'' AWARDS

The second case I would like to share with my colleagues is the story

of former Sgt. David Allen Fisher, who also discovered what appears to

be a cache of chemical weapons where the Department of Defense says

none were deployed.

In this case, as in the other cases like it, it seems impossible to

obtain an explanation from the Department of Defense that is consistent

with the events as reported by the soldiers present. In August, a

Pentagon spokesperson stated that whatever chemicals were encountered

in the bunker must have been left over from earlier fighting between

Iraq and Iran.

However, in September 1994, that same spokesperson said that he was

not aware that any chemical weapons crates were discovered by Mr.

Fisher, despite Colonel Dunn's report and despite the fact that Mr.

Fisher received a Purple Heart for his injuries from chemical agents.

Others who were present that date including the Fox vehicle operators,

one of whom received a bronze star and Colonel Dunn corroborate these

events. Further, according to Mr. Fisher, this was an active bunker

complex with artillery pieces present and their mission there was to go

from bunker to bunker searching for Iraqi soldiers. Old chemical

weapons, left over from a previous war, would be stored in a separate

storage facility; if they were present at an active artillery position,

they were deployed with the intention of using them.

What continues to emerge is a deeply troubling pattern of events

involving individuals who have received medals--Bronze Stars,

Meritorious Service Medals, Army Commendation Medals, and Purple

Hearts--in the course of comming into contact with weapons that the

Department of Defense insists were not even present in the theater of

war. Chemical and biological weapons were either present, or they were

not present. These events I have discussed raise serious concerns about

the veracity of the Department of Defense's claims as well as their

motives. I fully expect to find additional ``exceptions'' to the

Department of Defense assertion that, at no time, were chemical or

biological weapons ever found in the theater of operations.

I have no further confidence in the Defense Department's statement on

this vital matter. The evidence continues to grow that they will go to

any length to deny the facts surrounding this subject.

We now know that there were chemicals found near An Nasiriyah, in an

area that was secured by elements of the 18th Airborne Corps. The U.N.

confirms that they were there, and a Defense Department official

testifying before the Senate Banking Committee confirmed that troops

were close to this facility--contradicting previous testimony in the

same hearing by another senior Defense Department official;

The medical and technical evidence establishes that chemicals were

found in an Iraqi bunker complex south of Basra in an area that was

secured by elements of the 3d Armored Division;

According to official records and scientific evidence, chemicals were

found in a container in southeastern Kuwait in an area tested by

Kuwaiti, British, and American soldiers from the 11th Armored Cavalry

Regiment;

And, according to Marine Corps historical documents, two marines were

injured by chemical agents in breaching operations during the ground

war.

We also know that many of the soldiers that were present during each

of these events are now ill and others were given medals.

So what is the truth? Certainly not in the official Defense

Department statement that all U.S. troops were far from any chemical

agents. Were there 2, 3, 5, 10, or 100 chemical events like those

described above? Will Members of Congress and the soldiers have to

uncover each and every exposure in order to determine the causes of

these illnesses. And what can be best done to treat these sick, and

often dying, gulf war veterans?

We cannot allow the U.S. military establishment or our government to

turn its back upon hundreds of thousands of Americans and their

families who answered their country's call and who were almost

certainly exposed to chemical or biological weapons agents during the

gulf war. And what of the risk of those same exposures in future wars?

Is that why the Department of Defense is behaving in this manner--to

hide their lack of ability to adequately protect our troops from these

kinds of exposures in future wars?

new laboratory findings of materials found on the battlefield

Finally, I have submitted samples for analysis to several renowned

laboratories, including the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's

Forensic Science Center. In biological analyses, based on preliminary

testing using advanced DNA analyses and screening techniques, unique

DNA sequences were detected for Q-fever and brucella on the inside of a

gas mask carrying case, the top of a gas mask filter, and under the

rubber seal of masks submitted to my office for analysis by U.S.

Persian Gulf war veterans who brought them back from the Middle East.

When additional primer pairs were compared, the findings were

negative. These tests were repeated with identical findings--that is,

the same identical DNA primer pairs were indicated.

While false positive DNA testing can occur with only a single primer

pair analysis, these results can also be indicative of the presence of

only a single strand--perhaps due to the presence of another

genetically altered biological warfare-related microorganism.

We do know that the United States licensed the export of genetic

materials capable of being used to create these types of genetically-

altered biological warfare agents to the Iraqi Atomic Energy

Commission--an Iraqi governmental agency that conducted biological

warfare-related research--prior to the war. One method of creating

these genetically altered micro-organisms is by exposing them to

radiation. The United States also licensed that export of several

species of brucella to Iraqi governmental agencies. Both Q-fever and

brucellosis are also endemic to the region.

This study is far from conclusive but points to the need for further

research in this area. According to the Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory, biological studies need further attention. Cultures need to

be investigated more closely.

In addition many chemical compounds were present in the samples. The

scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Forensic Science

Center believe that additional analysis of more samples may isolate and

identify chemicals that in combination may be hazardous, chemical

warfare agent compounds, or biological pathogens on the surface of

collected items and that more study is warranted.

While these results are preliminary they are also very important.

They show that we have the tools to get to the bottom of this problem

if we simply choose to use them. Let me repeat that. We have the tools

to get to the bottom of this problem if we simply choose to use them.

The human toll continues to rise. Just over 1 year ago, on September

9, 1993, when the first staff report was prepared by the committee, we

were only able to estimate the numbers of sick veterans. Since that

time we have learned that 5,400 Persian Gulf war veterans has already

registered with the Department of Veterans Affairs up to that point.

The official Department of Defense Registry numbered only a few

hundred. But in just over a years time the number of veterans who have

since been added to these registries has grown by nearly 700 percent.

Currently it is estimated that there are 29,000 servicemen and women on

the Department of Veterans Affairs Persian Gulf Registry and 7,000 on

the Department of Defense Registry. The Department of Defense registry

is growing at a terrifying rate of about 500 individuals per week.

These are horrendous statistics that show the true scale of this

problem and the heartlessness and irresponsibility of a military

bureaucracy that gives every sign of wanting to protect itself more

than the health and well-being of our servicemen and women who actually

go and fight our wars.

We have also learned that many of the signs and symptoms of illnesses

initially experienced by the veterans of the Persian Gulf war are now

being experienced by their spouses and families. This data confirms

that these illnesses are becoming a major threat to the health and

well-being of a significant and rapidly growing number of individuals

and warrants a serious and all out urgent effort by the Government to

determine the precise causes of the illnesses.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of my

statement be inserted in the Record, and that excerpts from the staff

report prepared by the committee on this issue be inserted into the

Record in the appropriate place at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in

the Record, as follows:

U.S. Chemical and Biological Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact

on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War--Committee Staff

Report No. 3: Chemical Warfare Agent Identification, Chemical Injuries,

and Other Findings

A. Background

The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

is responsible for U.S. government legislation and oversight

as it effects ``dual use'' exports--those materials and

technologies that can be converted to military uses.

During the Cold War, United States export policy focused

primarily on restricting the export of sensitive ``dual use''

materials and technologies to the Soviet Union and its

allies. This myopic approach to the non-proliferation of

these materials ultimately resulted in the acquisition of

unconventional weapons and missile-system technologies by

several ``pariah nations'' with aggressive military agendas.

For the United States, the reality of the dangers associated

with these types of policies were realized during the Persian

Gulf War. Recognizing the shortcomings of existing policies,

and with the dissolution of the Soviet empire, an inquiry was

initiated by the Committee into the contributions that

exports from the United States played in the weapons of mass

destruction programs that have flourished under the direction

of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

On October 27, 1992, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and

Urban Affairs held hearings that revealed that the United

States had exported chemical, biological, nuclear, and

missile-system equipment to Iraq that was converted to

military use in Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear

weapons program. Many of these weapons--weapons that the U.S.

and other countries provided critical materials for--were

used against us during the war.

On June 30, 1993, several veterans testified at a hearing

of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. There, they

related details of unexplained events that took place during

the Persian Gulf War which they believed to be chemical

warfare agent attacks. After these unexplained events, many

of the veterans present reported symptoms consistent with

exposure to a mixed agent attack. Then, on July 29, 1993, the

Czech Minister of Defense announced that a Czechoslovak

chemical decontamination unit had detected the chemical

warfare agent Sarin in areas of northern Saudi Arabia during

the early phases of the Gulf War. They had attributed the

detections to fallout from coalition bombing of Iraqi

chemical warfare agent production facilities.

In August 1993, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Donald W.

Riegle Jr. began to research the possibility that there may

be a connection between the Iraqi chemical, biological, and

radiological warfare research and development programs and a

mysterious illness which was then being reported by thousands

of returning Gulf War veterans. In September 1993, Senator

Riegle released a staff report on this issue an introduced an

amendment to the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense

Authorization Act that provided preliminary funding for

research of the illnesses and investigation of reported

exposures.

When this first staff report was released by Senator

Riegle, the estimates of the number of veterans suffering

form these unexplained illnesses varied from hundreds,

according to the Department of Defense, to thousands,

according to the Department of Veterans Affairs. It is now

believed that tens of thousands of U.S. Gulf War veterans are

suffering from a myriad of symptoms collectively labelled

either Gulf War Syndrome, Persian Gulf Syndrome, or Desert

War Syndrome. Hundreds and possibly thousands of servicemen

and women still on active duty are reluctant to come forward

for fear of losing their jobs and medical care. These Gulf

War veterans are reporting muscle and joint pain, memory

loss, intestinal and heart problems, fatigue, nasal

congestion, urinary urgency, diarrhea, twitching, rashes,

sores, and a number of other symptoms.

They began experiencing these multiple symptoms during and

after--often many months after--their tour of duty in the

Gulf. A number of the veterans who initially exhibited these

symptoms have died since returning from the Gulf. Perhaps

most disturbingly, members of veteran's families are now

suffering these symptoms to a debilitating degree. The scope

and urgency of this crisis demands an appropriate response.

This investigation into Gulf War Syndrome, which was

initiated by the Banking Committee under the direction of

Chairman Riegle, has uncovered a large body of evidence

linking the symptoms of the syndrome to the exposure of Gulf

War participants to chemical and biological warfare agents,

chemical and biological warfare pre-treatment drugs, and

other hazardous materials and substances. Since the release

of the first staff report on September 9, 1993, this inquiry

has continued. Thousands of government officials, scientists,

and veterans have been interviewed or consulted, and

additional evidence has been compiled. This report will

detail the findings of this ongoing investigation.

On February 9, 1994, Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr.

disclosed on the U.S. Senate floor that the U.S. government

actually licensed the export of deadly microorganisms to

Iraq. It was later learned that these microorganisms exported

by the United States were identical to those the United

Nations inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi

biological warfare program.

Throughout this investigation, the Department of Defense

has assured the Committee that our troops were never exposed

to chemical or biological agents during the Persian Gulf War.

They have repeatedly testified in hearings and have made

public statements that, at no time, were chemical and

biological agents ever found in the Kuwaiti theater of

operations.

In February of this year, the Chairman wrote a letter

asking them to declassify all information on the exposure of

U.S. forces to chemical and biological agents.

Then on May 4, 1994, the Chairman received assurances in a

joint letter from Secretary Perry, Secretary Brown, and

Secretary Shalala, that ``there is no classified information

that would indicate any exposures to or detections of

chemical or biological weapons agents.''\1\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\Footnotes at end of article.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Also in May, Undersecretary of Defense Edwin Dorn in sworn

testimony in a hearing before the Committee on Banking,

Housing, and Urban Affairs, claimed that all chemical agents

were discovered ``a great distance from the Kuwait theater of

operations.''\2\

During the same hearing, another senior Defense Department

official was forced to recant part of the statement when

confronted with the highly publicized discovery of chemical

agents by U.N. inspectors near An Nassiriyah, which was very

close to areas in which U.S. forces were deployed.\3\

In fact, we have received reports from Persian Gulf War

veterans that U.S. forces actually secured this chemical

weapons storage area.

Also during the hearing, a joint memorandum for Persian

Gulf War veterans from Secretary of Defense Perry and the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was presented. The

memorandum stated, in part ``there is no information,

classified or unclassified, that indicated that chemical or

biological weapons were used in the Gulf.''\4\

Then, the Department of Defense announced on June 23, 1994,

that the Defense Science Board found that ``there is no

evidence that either chemical or biological warfare was

deployed at any level, or that there was any exposure of U.S.

service members to chemical or biological warfare

agents.''\5\

This report raises serious questions about the integrity of

the Department of Defense position. It describes events for

which the Department of Defense explanations are inconsistent

with the facts as related by the soldiers who were present,

and with official government documents prepared by those who

were present and with experts who have examined the facts.

b. recovery of chemical agents in kuwait

August 1991--Sabahiyah High School for Girls

The Committee staff has obtained British and U.S. Army

reports which document in detail the discovery of more than

250 gallons of dangerous chemical agents. According to the

units that were presents, mustard gas and another blister

agent were found in a storage tank in southeastern Kuwait.

These chemical agents were recovered in Kuwait, well inside

the Kuwait theater of operations, well inside areas occupied

by U.S. and British forces. According to the reports, they

had been placed there by Iraqi forces during the occupation

of Kuwait. The liquid was tested and over 20 times the

presence of chemical agents was confirmed.

The Committee staff has obtained a copy of a recommendation

for an Army Commendation Medal that was presented to Sergeant

James Warren Tucker for among other things ``participating in

the mission that located stores of chemicals agents'' while

deployed in Southwest Asia.\6\

Committee staff has also identified the commander of that

unit, Captain Michael F. Johnson, currently with the U.S.

Army at The Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia--who was

awarded a Meritorious Service Medal for his actions.\7\

These two soldiers and as many as six others from the 54th

Chemical Troop of the United States Army's 11th Armored

Cavalry Regiment were given Army medals for ``the positive

identification of suspected chemical agent,'' according to

the citation presented to Captain Johnson.\8\

We have obtained the actual reports from two NATO countries

who were Coalition members during the Persian Gulf War.\9\

This is a step-by-step analysis of the event as recorded in

documents and the testimony of Nuclear Biological and

Chemical, or NBC, officers who were there.

A container suspected of containing chemical agents was

located in southeastern Kuwait in an area about 50 kilometers

north of Saudi Arabia and 4 kilometers west of the Persian

Gulf. The precise coordinates are TN18832039 (Magellan)\10\

Maps showing the precise location in which this container was

found is attached.\11\

According to the British report, on August 5, 1991, several

months after the end of the Persian Gulf War, Major J.P.

Watkinson of the British Army received orders to investigate

a container that was believed to be leaking mustard gas.\12\

According to the official report prepared by Major

Watkinson on 7 August 1991, the request to investigate the

leaking container was made by Lt. Colonel Saleh Al Ostath of

the Kuwaiti Army and agreed to by Mr. Lucas of the Royal

Ordinance Corps.\13\

Major Watkinson and his unit, the 21st Explosive Ordinance

Disposal Squadron, were taken to the site of the Sabahiyah

High School for Girls and directed to a metal storage tank

with a capacity of approximately 2,000 liters. According to

the report, there appeared to be entry and exit bullet holes

of approximately 7.62 caliber in the container.\14\

A photograph of the schoolyard with some of the chemical

specialists approaching the tank that contained the chemical

agents is attached.\15\

According to Major Watkinson's report, the container was

leaking a brown vapor from both holes. The school was not in

use and there were U.S. civilian contractors clearing

explosives and rubbish from the area.\16\

The school security guard told the British that the tank

was not there before the war. He first noticed the tank when

he returned to the school after the war on March 20, 1991--

four and a half month prior to these tests. The British

report notes that the school was used as an Iraqi defensive

position during the war.\17\

Major Watkinson ordered all personnel to move up wind, and

after putting on his chemical protective clothing, approached

the container and tested the brown colored vapor with a

Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM).\18\

The Chemical Agent Monitor gave a reading of eight ( Cool

bars

on H, for mustard agent--a maximum reading indicating a

highly concentrated agent--and no bars on G, indicating no

nerve agent present.\19\

This was the first positive test for chemical mustard agent

at this location.

Distilled mustard is described in the Merck Index, a

handbook for chemists, as an oily substance. It is also

described as being amber brown in color--remember Watkinson's

report describes it as a brown substance.\20\

A photo and diagram of a Chemical Agent Monitor or CAM in

use showing the types of displays that a chemical detection

specialist would observe is attached.\21\

A 8-bar reading indicates a highly concentrated agent.

These monitors are still in use by both U.S. and British

forces.

Watkinson then tested the vapor with one color detector

paper and nothing happened. He used three color detector

paper and it turned pink indicating the presence of mustard

agent.\22\ This was the second positive test for mustard

agent.

On a second visit to the container, according to the

report, he inserted a wire with one of the bullet holes, and

according to his report, ``wiped the oily substance on both

types of detector paper.''\23\

Again the oily nature of the substance indicates a property

that is consistent with the properties of mustard agent.

The one color paper turned brown and the three colored

paper turned pink, the latter again indicating the presence

of mustard agent. This was the third positive test for

mustard agent. Major Watkinson then sealed both in the

container with masking tape.\24\

On yet a third visit to the container, the holes were

uncovered and the vapor was tested using an M18A2 chemical

detector kit. This test was repeated six times. On four of

the tests the color indicator immediately turned blue

indicating mustard (or ``H'') agent.\25\

For the remaining two tests, the color indicator went

yellow but later turned blue.\26\ There were the fourth

through the ninth positive tests for mustard agent.

Another wire dip test was conducted using the three color

detector paper from the M18A2 kit and the paper turned

pinkish/orange indicating mustard agent for the tenth time.

The bullet holes were resealed using industrial silicone

filler and plaster of paris bandages. The container was

checked with the Chemical Agent Monitor for leaks and the

area was secured.\27\

On August 7, 1991, the Commander of the 11th Armored

Cavalry Regiment was asked to send two FOX chemical

reconnaissance vehicles, in support of the Kuwaiti Ministry

of Defense and the Royal Ordinance Corps, to assist Major

Watkinson in confirming the presence of a chemical agent.\28\

Since this was a joint and combined live agent chemical

detection mission, involving both U.S. and British forces,

detailed rehearsals occurred to ensure that no mistakes were

made. The unit then travelled to the Sabahiyah High School

for Girls in southeastern Kuwait.\29\

On August 8, 1991, one FOX team moved to the area near the

container and began to conduct point surveys inserting the

detection probe of the FOX vehicle into the ground to a depth

of about four centimeters. The mass spectrometer showed

microdoses of chemical mustard agent in the ground.\30\ This

was the eleventh confirmation'

At the same time another collection team in full chemical

protective clothing walked to the container, estimated to

contain between 800-1000 liters, or about 250 gallons of

liquid, with Chemical Agent Monitors and other assorted

chemical detection equipment. This team removed the storage

container's seals and there was a discharge of pressurized

vapor into the air.\31\

Captain Johnson's report confirms that he saw a light

copper to amber colored vapor exit from the hole.\32\ Again,

mustard agent is described as an amber brown liquid.\33\

Tests were conducted with both the Chemical Agent Monitor

and chemical detection paper. The detection paper confirmed

the presence of chemical mustard agent; the twelfth

confirmation. The Chemical Agent Monitor registered eight

bars, again confirming highly concentrated mustard agent.

This was the thirteenth confirmation of mustard agent by the

specialists present.\34\

Captain Johnson's unit then inserted a medical syringe with

a catheter tube into the container to extract liquid agent

for detection paper, Chemical Agent Monitor, and FOX

testing.\35\

The sample was placed into a metal dish. By the time a

ground team member moved to the rear of the Fox to the probe,

there was not enough liquid available to get a reliable

reading.\36\

Another attempt was made and the ground team extracted a

larger sample of liquid and placed it into the metal dish.

The dish was moved to the FOX probe and the liquid was drawn

for analysis--not random vapors--not oil fumes--but the

actual liquid chemical agent. Within six seconds, the mass

spectrometer detected and identified the liquid as highly

concentrated mustard agent.\37\ Both four point and full

spectrum readings were obtained, according to Captain

Johnson, in each of the mass spectrometer analyses.\38\ This

therefore was the fourteenth (4 point) and fifteenth (full

spectrum) confirmation of mustard agent.

Further analysis by the system also indicated the presence

of traces phosgene, a non-persistent choking agent, and

phosgene oxime, a blister agent. Another test was conducted

to validate the findings. Again the Fox vehicle confirmed the

presence of mustard agent for the sixteenth and seventeenth

time, and again phosgene, and phosgene oxime were

confirmed.\39\

Captain Johnson ordered yet another mass spectrometer test,

utilizing the second FOX vehicle. The team in the second

vehicle was not informed of the findings of the first

vehicle, to rule out any possibility of biased readings from

the team in the second vehicle. The team in the second FOX

vehicle repeated the test and reported the same findings

except that this time the reported levels of phosgene oxime

were much higher. They also performed a second test to

confirm their results. Again both 4-point and full spectrum

analysis was conducted during each of these tests.\40\ These

were the eighteenth through twenty-first confirmations.

While the Chemical Agent Monitor and many other chemical

detection kits available to military forces only detect H, or

mustard agents, and G and V nerve agents, the FOX chemical

reconnaissance vehicle accurately detects 60 known chemical

agents using a computerized mobile mass spectrometer.\41\

It is capable of identifying the individual component

chemical elements, such as sulfur, hydrogen, chlorine, and so

forth; their molecular composition; and their molecular

weight. This provides a scientific means to precisely

identify substances.

In response to a request by the Committee for an

explanation from the Department of Defense, Dr. Theodore

Prociv, Deputy Assistant for Chemical and Biological Matters

(Atomic Energy), replied on July 26 that the Department of

Defense analysis of the FOX tapes revealed that the ions

matched in three of four categories for a mustard agent, but

matched nitric acid in all four categories.\42\

Committee staff solicited an opinion from the National

Institute of Standards and Technology regarding the accuracy

of this explanation.\43\

On September 6, in response to several specific questions,

Dr. Stephen Stein, of the Institute, replied that ``HD

[mustard] has no major peaks in common with those expected to

arise directly from fuming nitric acid,'' and that it is

``highly unlikely that a properly functioning mass

spectrometer would produce any of the major peaks of nitric

acid or nitrogen oxides from HD.'' Furthermore, ``if fuming

red nitric acid did not decompose prior to detection

(ionization) there would be no possibility of mistaking it

for HD.''\44\

The commander of the unit said that the tests were run

using both the four principle mass peaks and full spectrum

analysis on the substance in question. The tests were run

twice each by two FOX vehicles. The mass spectrometers were

checked for calibration before and after each test, with no

problems noted.

Each of the four tests identified identical substances--

namely; mustard agent and phosgene oxime. When asked

specifically, ``how likely is it that under these

circumstances that the computer algorithm identified nitric

acid as these substances,'' Dr. Stein responded that ``if

fuming red nitric acid did not react prior to detection,

there is no likelihood that either the four peak analysis or

the full spectrum analysis would lead to false identification

of mustard.''\45\

And, ``if nitric acid did react, the reaction products

might generate a large number of peaks. Some of these might

fortuitously be those characteristic of HD or other chemical

agents and therefore might produce a false positive 4-peak

identification of HD. A robust full spectrum matching

algorithm, however, would not be expected to falsely identify

mustard.''\46\

The ground collection team then extracted a larger sample

from the container and prepared it for transport from the

area for further testing and evaluation.\47\

According to Captain Johnson's report and other eyewitness

testimony, a member of the British team was injured while

collecting a sample of the chemical agent. Some of the liquid

agent made contact with the soldiers left wrist. The soldier

immediately reacted to the liquid and was in severe pain and

was believed to be going into shock.\48\

The injured soldier was quickly taken to a decontamination

site and covered with decontamination powder and cut out of

his chemical protective clothing.\49\ A photograph of the

British soldier on the FOX vehicle and his clothing laying

in a pile beside the vehicle is attached.\50\

Dr. Prociv in his July 26, 1994 letter to the Committee

reported that the injured soldiers clothing had been found by

the British government to have been burned by fuming nitric

acid in tests conducted at Porton Down.\51\ Previously, in

response to direct questioning by Committee Staff, Captain

Johnson stated that the contaminated suit was burned, that

is, incinerated, at the site.\52\

The decontamination team then doused the soldier with a

decontamination solution. Within one minute, a small blister

was observed forming on his left wrist the size of a pinhead.

About five minutes later, the blister had already reached the

size of a U.S. fifty cent piece coin. Medics on the scene

screened the victim for residual liquid contamination and

sent him to the hospital for further treatment. After the

casualty was evacuated, the rest of the unit and equipment

was decontaminated.\53\

According to Military Chemical and Biological Agents:

Chemical and Toxicological Properties, mustard agents acting

alone may take hours to form blisters, but phosgene oxime

acts within 30 seconds leaving a blanched area and

immediately forms a red rash-like ring. With phosgene oxime,

instant death from systemic shock or trauma is possible from

exposure.\54\

The reported reaction of the British casualty was as might

have been predicted when exposed to the identified agents.

The fate of this inured British soldier is unknown.

After completing their testing, the U.S. FOX team leaders

were ordered to remove the tapes from the mass spectrometer

of the FOX vehicles by Lieutenant Colonel Killgore, the

chemical officer for Task Force Vicotry.\55\ These tapes are

the paper records of the chemical breakdown of the liquid or

vapors and are produced by the mobile mass spectrometer in

the FOX vehicle.

The tapes and the collected samples were reportedly turned

over to personnel wearing desert camouflage uniforms with no

rank or distinguishing patches.\56\ Captain Johnson does not

know what happened to the tapes or samples as he was ordered

from the scene after his unit's mission was completed.\57\

Dr. Prociv in his written response to the Committee stated

that these were U.N. personnel. According to Lt. Colonel

Killgore, while they were United Nations personnel, they were

assigned to the U.N. team from the British Chemical and

biological Defense Establishment at Porton Down--British

Ministry of Defence employees.\58\ In a subsequent inquiry,

the U.N. could produce no written records of the findings of

the U.N. team at the site.

Conclusions--

Chemical mustard agent was detected by: chemical

specialists from the British Army using a Chemical Agent

Monitor, M18A2 chemical agent detector, and detector paper;

and, chemical specialists from the United States Army using a

Chemical Agent Monitor, detector paper, and two mass

spectrometers.

Phosgene oxime was detected by: two sophisticated FOX

vehicles' mass spectrometers.

These were direct samples--not random vapors collected by

the vehicle--as in previously reported cases.

As cited above, mass spectrometry is capable of identifying

the individual chemical elements, such as sulfur, hydrogen,

chlorine, and so forth; their molecular composition; and,

their molecular weight. This provides a means to precisely

identify substances. This was not an intake of random fumes

by a moving vehicle in heavy smoke, it was a direct analysis

of liquid agent drawn from the container.

This was not the only confirmation of the identity of the

chemical agents present--the results were confirmed by nearly

every detector deployed with U.S. and British forces--in a

controlled setting.

A British soldier who came into contact with the liquid

blistered immediately and appeared to be going into shock--as

might be predicted from the nature of the agents present.

The tapes were ordered removed from the vehicle and forward

with a sample of the chemical agents. The soldiers were

ordered to given the materials to individuals in unmarked

uniforms and Captain Johnson, who earlier this year, after

hearing that the Department of Defense was denying the

presence of chemical agents in Kuwait, forwarded the report

on this incident through his chain of command, and had the

report returned to him. It was not forwarded to the

Department of Defense.

The Kuwaiti, U.S., and British governments all received

reports on this recovery of bulk chemical agents.

While these reports are not classified, the Department of

Defense has consistently maintained that no chemical agents

were located in areas occupied by U.S. forces--including in

testimony before committees of both the House of

Representatives and the Senate.

The Department of the Army originally told Committee staff

that prior to releasing Captain Johnson's report they must

obtain clearance from the Department of Defense, and that an

intelligence review must be conducted.\59\ That would seem to

contradict the claim that there is no classified information

on this subject. They claimed that prior to releasing the

British report, they must get the permission of the

British.\60\ However, when British report was received, it

was dated July 14, 1994, indicating that it had been prepared

in response to the Committee request, in coordination with

the Department of Defense.\61\

The Committee was not provided with an official British

report dating from the time of the incident by the Department

of Defense as requested. A copy of that report was obtained

by the Committee outside of Department of Defense channels.

This official report, dated August 7, 1991, confirms that

mustard agent was detected, and that the substance was oily,

like mustard agent.\62\ Nitric acid is not oily.

The U.S. report, prepared by Captain Johnson, confirms that

not only was mustard agent detected in the container using a

mass spectrometer, but also in microdoses on the ground.\63\

This would eliminate the explanation that the container held

fuming nitric acid--rocket fuel oxidizer--so concentrated

that if reacted with materials in the mass spectrometer

causing false readings when the material was examined. The

mass spectrometers in both FOX vehicles were also

successfully calibrated before and after this detection

event.

There is also the issue of how the Department of Defense

has handled this and other investigations into reported

chemical agent detection events. Committee staff continues to

receive reports from individuals, many of whom are no longer

in the military--civilians who have been contacted by high

ranking military officers assigned to work with the Defense

Science Board Task Force investigating this issue. We have

received complaints from veterans that rather than trying to

seek other witnesses or corroborate their reports, these

officers have called to convince them that they were

mistaken. That their findings were not credible--that their

statements made to Congress would be refuted.\64\ Most

recently, an individual associated with this detection of

chemical agents was contacted by one of these officers. This

officer specifically told the individual that these findings

would be refuted by the Department of Defense--even before

the Department received the report from the British that was

eventually forwarded to the Committee.

In this case there were 21 field tests conducted on this

substance which were positive for mustard agent; both U.S.

and British Chemical Agent Monitor readings confirmed 8 bars

for mustard gas, a maximum reading indicating the presence of

highly concentrated agent; 8 of 8 mobile mass spectrometer

tests, using two separate FOX vehicles and liquid agent in a

controlled setting identified identical substances--mustard

agent, and phosgene oxime; it was the same color as mustard

agent; it was oily like mustard agent; a mobile mass

spectrometer reading indicated that microdoses of mustard

agent were present in the soil; a British soldier suffered a

chemical injury consistent with what would be expected when

exposed to these agents, particularly to phosgene oxime; and

the Department of Defense explanation was described by the

National Institute for Standards and Technology variously as

``highly unlikely,'' ``no likelihood,'' and ``not possible.''

c. chemical injury and chemical storage bunker

Iraqi Bunker Complex--Southeastern Iraq (between Kuwaiti border and

Basra) March 1, 1991

This case involves the experiences of former Sergeant David

Allen Fisher, who also discovered what appears to have been a

cache of chemical weapons where the Department of Defense

says none were deployed.

While searching an Iraqi ammunition bunker in Iraq in an

area south of Basra, Mr. Fisher brushed up against some

wooden crated marked with skulls and crossbones. Within 8

hours his arm had reddened and began to sting. Several hours

later, he noticed painful blisters on this upper arm.\65\

In his report of the incident, in a Question and Answer

Brief prepared for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Public

Affairs Office, and in a subsequent journal article, Colonel

Michael Dunn, who would later become the commander of the

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense

confirmed that Fisher's injuries were the result of exposure

to chemical agents.\66\

In this case, as in the other cases like it, it seems

impossible to obtain an explanation from the Department of

Defense that is consistent with the events as reported by the

soldiers present. In August, a pentagon spokesperson stated

that whatever chemicals were encountered in the bunker must

have been left over from earlier fighting between Iraq and

Iran.\67\

However, in September 1994, that same spokesperson said

that he was not aware that any chemical weapons crates were

discovered by Mr. Fisher, despite Colonel Dunn's report and

despite the fact that Mr. Fisher received a Purple Heart for

his injuries.\68\ Others who were present that date including

the FOX vehicle operators, one of whom received a bronze

star, and Colonel Dunn corroborate these events. Further,

according to Mr. Fisher, this was an active bunker complex

with artillery pieces present and their mission there was to

go from bunker to bunker searching for Iraqi soldiers.\69\

Old chemical weapons, left over from a previous war, would be

stored in a separate storage facility; if they were present

at an active artillery position, they were deployed with the

intention of using them.

d. chemical detection and chemical injuries

Breaching Operations--Second Marine Divi- sion--Southwestern Kuwait

February 24, 1991

The following is an excerpt take directly from ``U.S.

Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2D Marine

Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm,'' an official

report published in 1993 by the History and Museums Division,

Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC.

``The use of chemical munitions by the Iraqis had been

expected, but happily had not yet occurred. At approximately

0656, the ``Fox'' chemical reconnaissance vehicle at Red 1

detected a ``trace'' of mustard gas, originally thought to be

from a chemical mine. The alarm was quickly spread throughout

the division. Since everyone had been to don his protective

outer garments and boots the previous evening, it was only

necessary to hurriedly pull on a gas-mask and protective

gloves to attain MOPP level 4. A second ``Fox'' vehicle was

sent to the area, and confirmed the presence of an agent that

had probably been there a long time. Unknown in its origin,

it was still sufficiently strong to cause blistering on the

exposed arms of two AAV crewmen. Work continued on the

clearance of the lanes, and MOPP level was reduced to 2 after

about a half-hour.''\70\

Several issues are raised by this report. First, chemical

mustard agent was detected by the FOX vehicles with the unit.

Second, two marines were reportedly injured as a result of

exposure to these agents, Third, it is highly unlikely that

the chemical agents could have been there ``a long time.''

These detections were made in southwestern Kuwait, an area

not occupied by Iraq until after the invasion of Kuwait on

August 2, 1990. Investigation by the Committee into this

incident continues.

e. chemical and biological analysis of equipment

The Committee has submitted samples for analysis to several

renowned laboratories, including the Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory's Forensic Science Center.\71\

In biological analyses, based on preliminary testing using

advanced DNA analyses and screening techniques, unique DNA

sequences were detected. Q-fever and Brucella were indicated

on the inside of a gas mask carrying case, the top of a gas

mask filter, and under the rubber seal of a mask submitted to

the Committee for analysis by U.S. Persian Gulf War veterans

who brought them back from the Middle East.\72\

When additional primer pairs were compared, the findings

were negative. These tests were repeated with identical

findings--that is, the same identical unique DNA primer pairs

were indicated.\73\

While false positive DNA testing can occur with only a

single primer pair analysis, these results can also be

indicative of the presence of only a single strand--perhaps

due to the presence of another genetically-altered biological

warfare-related microorganism.\74\

We do know that the U.S. licensed the export of genetic

materials capable of being used to create thee types of

genetically-altered biological warfare agents to the Iraqi

Atomic Energy Commission--an Iraqi governmental agency that

conducted biological warfare-related research--prior to the

war.\75\ One method of creating these genetically altered

micro-organisms is by exposing them to radiation. The U.S.

also licensed the export of several species of brucella to

Iraqi governmental agencies.\76\ Both Q-fever and Brucellois

are also endemic to the region.\77\

This study is far from conclusive but points to the need

for further research in this area. According to the Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory, biological studies need

further attention. Cultures need to be investigated more

closely. Experiments to amplify the whole genome and to allow

for the manipulation of increased concentrations of DNA by

advanced testing would likely be more precise in identifying

threat organisms--organisms that may be causing Gulf War

Syndrome.

In addition many chemical compounds were present in the

samples. The scientists at Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory Forensic Science Center believe that additional

analysis of more samples may isolate and identify unusual

hazardous chemical compounds, chemicals that in combination

may be hazardous, chemical warfare agent compound's

or biological pathogens on the surface of collected

items--and that much more study is warranted.\78\

While these results are preliminary they are also very

important. They show that we have the tools to get to the

bottom of this problem if we simply choose to use them.

f. committee staff remarks

What seems to be emerging is a troubling pattern of events

involving individuals who have received medals--Bronze Stars,

Meritorious Service Medals, Army Commendation Medals, and

Purple Hearts--in the course of coming into contact with

unconventional weapons that the Department of Defense

continues to insist were not even present in theater.

Chemical and biological weapons were either present, or they

were not present. If weapons such as these were present, they

were deployed doctrinally, as a matter of Iraqi Army

practice, not in isolated instances. These events raise

serious concerns about the veracity of the Department of

Defense's claims as well as their motives. These reports call

into question each and every Department of Defense refutation

of previously reported detections and each and every

triggered chemical agent detection alarm.

We know that there were chemicals found near An Nasiriyah,

in an area that was secured by elements of the 18th Airborne

Corps. The U.N. confirms that they were there, and a Defense

Department official testifying before the Senate Banking

Committee confirmed that troops were close to this facility--

contradicting previous testimony in the same hearing by

another senior Defense Department official.

Careful scrutiny leads us to conclude that they were found

in a container in southeastern Kuwait in an area tested by

Kuwaiti, British, and American soldiers from the 11th Armored

Cavalry Regiment.

We know from the reports on Sergeant Fisher that they were

found in an Iraqi bunker complex south of Basra in an area

that was secured by elements of the 3rd Armored Division.

Two U.S. Marines were injured by chemical agents in

breaching operations during the ``ground war.''

We now know that many of the soldiers that were present

during each of these events are ill--others were given medals

for their actions. Many of the veterans of the Gulf War and

their families are now suffering permanently debilitating

illnesses--some have died. Currently it is estimated that

there are 29,000 servicemen and women on the Department of

Veterans Affairs Persian Gulf Registry and 7,000 on the

Department of Defense Registry. The Department of Defense

Registry is growing at a rate of about 500 individuals per

week.

Just over one year ago, on September 9, 1993, when the

first staff report was prepared for the Chairman, we were

forced to estimate the numbers of sick veterans. Since that

time we have learned that 5,400 Persian Gulf War veterans had

registered with the Department of Veterans Affairs up to that

point. The Department of Defense Registry numbered only a few

hundred. In just over a year's time the number of veterans

who have registered in these registries has grown by nearly

700%. We have also learned that many of the signs and

symptoms of illnesses initially experienced by the veterans

of the Persian Gulf War are now being experienced by their

spouses and families. This data confirms that these illnesses

are becoming a major threat to the health and well-being of a

significant and rapidly growing number of individuals and

warrants a serious and immediate effort by the government to

determine the precise causes of the illnesses.

Footnotes

\1\Letter to Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Committee on

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs from Secretary of Defense

William J. Perry, Secretary of Veterans Affairs Jesse Brown,

and Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala,

dated May 4, 1994. (Appendix A-1)

\2\Testimony of Dr. Edwin Dorn, Undersecretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness before the U.S. Senate Committee on

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs during a hearing convened

on U.S. Export Policies to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on

the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, on May 25,

1994. (Appendix A-2)

\3\Department of Defense testimony before the U.S. Senate

Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs during a

hearing convened on U.S. Export Policies to Iraq and Their

Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian

Gulf War, on May 25, 1994. (Appendix A-3)

\4\Memorandum for Persian Gulf War Veterans, Persian Gulf War

Health Issues, from John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and William J. Perry, Secretary of

Defense, dated 25 May 1994. (Appendix A-4)

\5\``Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on

Persian Gulf War Health Effects,'' Office of the

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,

(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, June 1994); and

Department of Defense Press Release, June 23, 1994.

\6\Recommendation for Award of Army Commendation Medal,

Sergeant James Warren Tucker, Decontamination Platoon Squad

Leader, 54th Chemical Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment,

dated July 1993. (Appendix B-1)

\7\Recommendation for and Award of Meritorious Service Medal,

Captain Michael F. Johnson, Troop Commander, 54th Chemical

Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, dated January 1993.

(Appendix B-2)

\8\Ibid.

\9\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents--

Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi

Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.

Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994--FOR

OFFICIAL USE ONLY--Appendix B-3). Initial Report: Suspected

Chemical Container, prepared by Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer

Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron Group, Royal Ordinance (United

Kingdom), dated 7 August 1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN

CONFIDENCE--(Appendix B-4).

\10\Ibid.

\11\From Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container,

prepared by Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st

EOD Squadron Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7

August 1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--(Appendix

B-5, B-6).

\12\Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container, prepared by

Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron

Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7 August

1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--Appendix B-4).

\13\Ibid.

\14\Ibid.

\15\Appendix B-7.

\16\Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container, prepared by

Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron

Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7 August

1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--(Appendix B-4).

\17\Ibid.

\18\Ibid.

\19\Ibid.

\20\Susan Budavari, ed., ``The Merck Index: An Encyclopedia

of Chemicals, Drugs, and Biologicals, Eleventh Edition``

(Rahway, N.J.: Merck and Co., Inc., 1989), pp. 995-996.

(Appendix B- Cool

James A.F. Comptom, Military Chemical and

Biological Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties

(Caldwell, N.J.: The Telford Press, (September 1987), 9-17.

(Appendix B-9)

\21\Jane's NBC Protection Equipment, 1990-91, (London, U.K.:

Jane's Information Group, 1991). Appendix B-10).

\22\Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container, prepared by

Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron

Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7 August

1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--(Appendix B-4).

\23\Ibid.

\24\Ibid.

\25\Ibid.

\26\Ibid.

\27\Ibid.

\28\Memorandum for the Commander, 11th ACR, Tasking Number

91-047, dated 7 August 1991 from Joseph W. Miller, Lieutenant

Colonel, GS, ACofs, G-3. (Appendix B-11)

\29\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents--

Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi

Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.

Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR

OFFICAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).

\30\Ibid.

\31\Ibid.

\32\Ibid.

\33\Ibid.

\33\James A.F. Comptom, ``Military Chemical and Biological

Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties'' (Caldwell,

N.J.: The Telford Press, (September 1987), 9-17. (Appendix B-

9)

\34\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents-

Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi

Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.

Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR

OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).

\35\Ibid.

\36\Ibid.

\37\Ibid.

\38\Staff interviews with Captain Johnson and Sergeant

Tucker.

\39\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents

Information Paper; To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi

Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.

Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR

OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).

\40\Ibid.

\41\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents

Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi

Chemical Agents identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.

Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR

OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).

\42\Letter to Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Committee on

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, from Dr. Theodore M.

Prociv, Deputy for Chemical and Biological Matters, Office of

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, dated

July 26, 1994. (Appendix B-12).

\43\Committee inquiry to the National Institute of Standards

and Technology, dated August 1, 1994. (Appendix B-13).

\44\Letter to Committee staff from Dr. Stephen E. Stein,

Ph.D., Director, National Institute for Standards and

Technology, Director, Mass Spectrometry Data Center, Chemical

Science and Technology Laboratory, dated September 6, 1994.

(Appendix B-14).

\45\Ibid.

\46\Ibid.

\47\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents

Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi

Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.

Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR

OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).

\48\Ibid.

\49\Ibid.

\50\Appendix B-15.

\51\Letter to Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Committee on

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, from Dr. Theodore M.

Prociv, Deputy for Chemical and Biological Matters, Office of

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, dated

July 26, 1994. (Appendix B-10).

\52\Committee staff interviews with Captain Michael F.

Johnson.

\53\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents

Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi

Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.

Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR

OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).

\54\James A.F. Comptom, ``Military Chemical and Biological

Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties'' (Caldwell,

N.J.: The Telford Press, (September 1987), 9-17. (Appendix B-

16)

\55\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents

Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi

Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.

Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR

OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).

\56\Ibid.

\57\Staff interviews.

\58\Memorandum for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Chemical Biological Matters (OASD(CBM)), Suspect

Chemical Container found in Kuwait City, Kuwait City, Kuwait,

in August 1991, Don W. Killgore, Lieutenant Colonel,

Technical Inspections Branch, Office of the Inspector

General, Department of the Army, July 29, 1994.--FOR OFFICIAL

USE ONLY--(Appendix B-17)

\59\Staff interviews with Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S.

Department of the Army.

\60\Ibid.

\61\Memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel Vicki Merriman, Office

of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for

Chemical and Biological Matters from Dr. Graham S. Pearson,

Director General, Chemical and Biological Defence

Establishment, Ministry of Defence, Porton Down, Salisbury,

Wilts, U.K., Suspect Chemical Container: Kuwait City: August

1991. (Appendix B-18)

\62\Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container, prepared by

Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron

Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7 August

1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--(Appendix B-4).

\63\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents--

Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi

Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F.

Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR

OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).

\64\Letter of complaint from Mr. Randall Vallee, September

23, 1994 (Appendix B-19) and staff interviews.

\65\Information Paper: Chemical Agent Exposure--Operation

Desert Storm, prepared and authenticated by Colonel Michael

A. Dunn, March 5, 1991. (Appendix C-1)

\66\Information Paper: Chemical Agent Exposure--Operation

Desert Storm, prepared and authenticated by Colonel Michael

A. Dunn, March 5, 1991. (Appendix C-1), Question and Answer

Brief prepared for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Public

Affairs Office, March 1991 (Appendix C-2), Lieutenant Colonel

John V. Wade, Major Robert M. Gum, and Colonel Michael A.

Dunn, ``Medical Chemical Defense in Operation Desert Shield

and Desert Storm,'' Journal of the U.S. Army Medical

Department, (January-February 1992), pp. 34-36. (Appendix C-

3)

\67\Thomas D. Williams, ``Veteran's Story Counters Official

One on Gas War,'' The Hartford Courant (September 21, 1994)

A2. (Appendix C-4)

\68\Ibid.

\69\Staff interviews.

\70\Lieutenant Dennis P. Mroczkowski, ``U.S. Marines in the

Persian Gulf, 1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert

Shield and Desert Storm,'' (Washington, D.C.: History and

Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), p.

41 (Appendix D-1), p. 45 (Appendix D-2).

\71\Laboratory analysis request from Chairman Donald W.

Riegle, Jr., Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Forensic

Science Center, dated April 15, 1994. (Appendix E-1)

\72\Brian Andresen, Ph.D., Jackie Stilwell, M.S., Patrick

Grant, Ph.D., Jeff Haas, M.S., Richard Whipple, B.A., and

Armando Arcaraz, M.S., ``Preliminary Results of Gas Masks and

Exposure-Monitoring Equipment Associated with Desert Storm:

Chemical and Biological Analyses of First Samples Sent,''

Forensic Science Center, J Division/NAI Directorate, Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory, June 1994 (Appendix E-2);

Staff interviews with laboratory personnel.

\73\Ibid.

\74\Ibid.

\75\American Type Culture Collection, Rockville, Maryland

(January 21, 1994).

\76\American Type Culture Collection, Rockville, Maryland

(January 21, 1994).

\77\Robert Berkow, M.D., Editor-in-Chief, The Merck Manual of

Diagnosis and Therapy, Sixteenth Edition (Rahway, N.J.: Merck

and Co., Inc., 1992). Q-fever (Appendix E-3) and Brucellosis

(Appendix E-4) summaries attached.

\78\Brian Andresen, Ph.D., Jackie Stilwell, M.S., Patrick

Grant, Ph.D., Jeff Haas, M.S., Richard Whipple, B.A., and

Armando Arcaraz, M.S., ``Preliminary Results of Gas Masks and

Exposure-Monitoring Equipment Associated with Desert Storm:

Chemical and Biological Analyses of First Samples Sent,''

Forensic Science Center, J Division/NAI Directorate, Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory, June 1994 (Appendix E-2);

Staff interviews with laboratory personnel.

[size=42]Iraqis Buried Alive -- U.S. Attacked With Bulldozers During Gulf War Ground Attack[/size]

Sep 12, 1991

Patrick J. Sloyan

Newsday

FORT RILEY, Kan. - The U.S Army division that broke through Iraq's defensive front line used plows mounted on tanks and combat earthmovers to bury thousands of enemy soldiers - some still alive and firing their weapons - according to U.S. Army officials.

In the first two days of ground fighting in Operation Desert Storm last February, three brigades of the 1st Mechanized Infantry Division used the grisly innovation to destroy more than 70 miles of Iraqi trenches and bunkers being defended by more than 8,000 Iraqi soldiers, according to division estimates.

About 2,000 soldiers surrendered. But Iraqi dead and wounded, as well as defiant soldiers still firing their weapons, were buried beneath tons of sand, according to participants in the carefully planned and rehearsed assault.

"Once we went through there, other than the ones who surrendered, there wasn't anybody left," said Capt. Bennie Williams, who was awarded the Silver Star for his role.

Reporters were banned from witnessing the Feb. 24-25 attack, near the tip of the neutral zone that straddles the border between Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

Not a single American was killed during the attack that made an Iraqi body count impossible.

"For all I know, we could have killed thousands," said Col. Anthony Moreno, commander of the 2nd Brigade that led the assault on the heaviest defenses.

"I came through right after the lead company. What you saw was a bunch of buried trenches with peoples' arms and things sticking out of them."

A thinner line of trenches on Moreno's left flank was attacked by the 1st Brigade, commanded by Col. Lon Maggart. Maggart estimated that his force buried about 650 Iraqi soldiers.

Estimates could not be obtained from 3rd Brigade commanders. The 3rd Brigade was made up of units from the 2nd Armored Division.

Moreno and Maggart were among 1st Division troops to provide the first public details of the trench-line attack. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney made no mention of the 1st Division's tactics in a recent interim report to Congress on Operation Desert Storm. The only mention of burying Iraqi troops came when Cheney acknowledged that 457 dead enemy soldiers were buried during the ground war.

In most cases, each section of trench line was assigned two Abrams main battle tanks with plows shaped like giant teeth. The tanks took up positions on either side of the trenches, most of them 3 feet wide and 6 feet deep. Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Vulcan armored carriers fired into the Iraqi soldiers as the tanks covered them with mounds of sand.

Every American in the assault was inside armored vehicles, impervious to Iraqi small-arms fire. As the juggernaut rolled along, it had a dramatic effect on Iraqi troops watching the operation.

"As soldiers saw what we were doing and how effective and fast we were doing it, they began jumping out of their holes and surrendering," Moreno said.

Moreno and Maggart said the tactic was used as a means of minimizing U.S. casualties.

"I know burying people like that sounds pretty nasty," Maggart said, "but it would be even nastier if we had to put our troops in the trenches and clean them out with bayonets."

Moreno acknowledged the attack was at odds with an Army doctrine that calls for, but does not require, troops to leave their armored vehicles to clean out the trenches or to bypass and isolate fortified positions.

"This was not doctrine," Moreno said. "My concept is to defeat the enemy with your power and equipment. We're going to bludgeon them with every piece of equipment we've got. I'm not going to sacrifice the lives of my soldiers - it's not cost-effective."

The 1st Division engineer, Lt. Col. Stephen Hawkins, who helped devise the tactic, said it was designed in part to terrorize the Iraqis into surrendering and to destroy defensive positions for troops who might reinforce the defensive line.

But all the participants involved said the prime objective of the burial assault was to destroy the Iraqi defenders.

The Pentagon has withheld details of the assault from the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, committee officials said.

Burying the Iraqi trench lines was part of the bloodiest phase of the war for Iraqi troops as the 1st Division breached an 11-mile-wide gap in the frontline. The gap allowed two divisions of VII Corps safe passage for the brunt of the assault on Iraq's best troops, the Republican Guard.

Because the Iraqi barrier - stretching from the neutral zone to the Persian Gulf - posed the biggest threat to allied troops, it had been pounded since Jan. 16 by B-52 strategic bombers, tactical fighters and artillery barrages.

Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the allied commander, said U.S. troops found "very, very many dead" in the Iraqi front lines. And Schwarzkopf's staff has privately estimated that 50,000 to 75,000 Iraqis were killed in their trenches.

Pfc. Joe Queen of the 1st Engineers was awarded a Bronze Star for burying the Iraqi trenches with his combat earthmover.

"A lot of the guys were scared," Queen said. "But I enjoyed it."

---------------------------- BULLDOZERS AS ATTACK WEAPONS ---------------------------- U.S. forces used battle bulldozers and tanks outfitted with blades to bury Iraqi troops alive in their border trenches and reach the Republican Guard to the north.

Feb. 24-25 attack route

Republican Guard troops

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