The “hardcore fighters,” especially the foreign ones within the inner circle of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his top commanders, will likely remain in Iraq and Syria, and look to
join the underground resistance of an “ISIS, 2.0.” In all likelihood, these
guerrilla insurgent shards of ISIS will congeal into a clandestine terrorist organization. Besides conducting sporadic raids, ambushes, and, perhaps, spectacular attacks using suicide tactics, these ISIS fighters will rest, rearm, and recuperate.
A second group of fighters are those potential
“free agents” or mercenaries who are prevented from returning to their home countries. They can be expected to form a
cohort of stateless jihadists who will travel abroad in search of the the next jihadi
theater—Yemen, Libya, West Africa, or Afghanistan—to protect, sustain, and expand the boundaries of the so-called caliphate. These are the militant progeny of the original
mujahideen, or transnational jihadists that once filled the ranks of al-Qaeda and fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets, and in Chechnya and the Balkans. ISIS affiliates and local Sunni jihadists in these places would likely welcome an influx of battle-hardened comrades.
And then there is the third group of foreign fighters: “the returnees.” This is the cohort that most
concerns those in counterterrorism circles. These fighters may attempt to
return to their countries of origin, like Tunisia or Saudi Arabia, or go further afield to Europe, Asia, or North America. States with more
robust national defense structures—well-trained border police, world-class intelligence services—stand a better chance of blunting their impact. But all Western security services are not created equal: Some will inevitably have a tougher time containing this threat than others. Further complicating the issue is the
inability among nation-states, especially those within the European Union, to even agree on the definition of “foreign fighter.”
The returnees are not as homogeneous a group as they may seem. Some will be among the “disillusioned”—those that
went to Syria in search of utopia, adventure, and an opportunity to express their religious identity and instead found something far different. According to interviews and
other research, local Syrians—whom the fighters said they went to “save”—did not respect them. These fighters struggled to fend for themselves when it came to obtaining basic things like food and financing, and grappled with the
tribulations of war. But upon returning to the West, they could be used to mentor other radicalized youth. These fighters may require psychological care, not prison time.
There is a second subgroup of returnees that we’ll call the “disengaged but not disillusioned.” Just as militants are motivated to join the fight for a variety of reasons, they may
leave it behind for any number of reasons: an impending marriage, battle fatigue, or because they miss their families. They are, however, still committed to jihadism. As one returnee recently said, “I left ISIS, but if another fight happened somewhere else, I would probably go.” This individual grew disillusioned with ISIS as an organization, but not with jihad as a whole.
The final subgroup of returnees are the “operational” returnees: returning fighters who attempt to resuscitate dormant networks, recruit new members, or conduct lone-wolf style attacks. They will be well-positioned to
attempt attacks under the
command and control of what remains of ISIS in the Middle East. They are the
most deadly. The November 2015 Paris attacks, conducted by foreign fighters who trained in Syria and were dispatched to France, are perhaps the clearest instance of this. Operational returnees are an even bigger concern if, in fact, hundreds of operatives have already been deployed to Europe, with hundreds more hiding out on
Europe’s doorstep in Turkey.
For the West, countering these different groups will require a range of strategies. The hardcore fighters who remain in Iraq and Syria must be killed or captured by Iraqi Security Forces and the rest of the coalition battling ISIS. Taking on the roving bands of militants calls for continued efforts to build the partner capacity of host-nation forces in weak and fragile states—training and equipping military and security forces, strengthening the rule of law, and promoting good governance and a host of other medium to long-term objectives.
While the EU is distracted with the fallout from Brexit and Russian meddling in national elections, militant jihadists will be streaming back into Europe, some of them determined to strike. And while transnational terrorists will undoubtedly flock to Libya and Yemen, the real challenge will be preventing further attacks around the globe, including in major European cities.