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 التقرير الدوري لمراكز الابحاث الاميركية 23/2/2018

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التقرير الدوري لمراكز الابحاث الاميركية 23/2/2018 Empty
مُساهمةموضوع: التقرير الدوري لمراكز الابحاث الاميركية 23/2/2018   التقرير الدوري لمراكز الابحاث الاميركية 23/2/2018 Emptyالسبت 24 فبراير 2018, 11:26 am

التقرير الدوري لمراكز الابحاث الاميركية 23/2/2018

نشرة دورية تصدر عن مركز الدراسات الأميركية والعربية

23 شباط - فبراير/‏ 2018  

المقدمة    

     تصدرت حادثة أطلاق النار داخل مدرسة ثانوية في ولاية فلوريدا التغطية الإعلامية ومراكز الأبحاث، على السواء؛ ومضى بعض المراكز في استعراض وتحليل إسقاط سوريا لطائرة مقاتلة "اسرائيلية،" من طراز إف-16، وتداعياتها المقبلة.

         يتناول قسم التحليل حادثة الإعتداء المسلح داخل مدرسة، على الرغم من أنها ليست الحادثة الأولى باستهداف مدارس ومقتل عشرات الطلبة، وتجدد الدعوة لتشديد القيود على إقتناء السلاح. الخلاصة المرئية ان مصير أي قانون جديد للحد من "سهولة شراء قطع سلاح،" في ظل انتشار "معارض السلاح" بكثرة، لن يكون أفضل حالً مما سبقه من مساعي سرعان ما تتلاشى بعد هدوء العاصفة الإعلامية، وذلك لقوة نفوذ لوبي السلاح وتخاذل الحزبين المهيمنين على السلطات الأميركية.

    

ملخص دراسات واصدارات مراكز الابحاث

سوريا:

         اعتبر معهد واشنطن لسياسات الشرق الأدنى اسقاط سوريا مقاتلة "اسرائيلية" متطورة، إف-16، أمراً "في غاية الأهمية .. واختباراً للخطوط الحمراء الأميركية والإسرائيلية في سوريا؛ (واكبه) إطلاق سوريا صواريخ أرض-جو؛ سقط عدد منها في شمال إسرائيل مما أدى إلى إطلاق أجهزة إنذار الدفاع المدني." وأضاف أن "دورة التصعيد .. شهدت إطلاق سوريا ما يزيد عن عشرين صاروخاً من طراز "سام" SA-3, SA-5, SA-6, SA-17” . وأردف متهماً "حرس الثورة الأيرانية وقوفه وراء العمليتين الاستفزازيتين الأخيرتين .. اللتين وقعتا على خلفية الثقة الأيرانية المتزايدة بأن التدخل في سوريا قد أنقذ نظام الأسد، وحدّ من انتشار القوات الأميركية شمال شرق البلاد؛ وسمح لطهران بإنشاء قاعدة للعمليات الموجهة ضد إسرائيل." ومضى المعهد بالقول أن "المواجهتين الأخيرتين تثيران أسئلة ملحة حول تحركات إيران المقبلة ودور روسيا المحتمل." وختم بالقول أنه يتعين على الولايات المتحدة "إبلاغ روسيا بأنها ستدافع بقوة عن مصالحها في سوريا .. والعمل سوياً على إعادة تنشيط الجهود الديبلوماسية، وتجنب تورط البلدين في مواجهة خطيرة."


The past week has witnessed two significant incidents involving lethal U.S. and Israeli airpower inside Syria. Each came in response to apparent tests by Syrian, Iranian, and Russian forces, and more such tests are probably in the offing.

PROBING ISRAEL
On February 10, an aircraft that appeared to be an Iranian Simorgh-type drone made a predawn incursion into northeastern Israel. According to Israeli military sources, the drone was piloted from an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) mobile ground-control station located at Syria's Tiyas air base near Palmyra. After an incursion lasting about ninety seconds, the drone was downed by an Israel Defense Forces Apache helicopter over the Beit Shean Valley. The IDF then scrambled eight F-16I jets to strike the Tiyas base.

In response, Syria fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) at the jets, including some that landed in northern Israel and triggered civil defense alarms. One of the F-16s was apparently downed by an SA-5 missile after failing to take proper evasive action while assessing damage to its targets; the two pilots ejected inside Israel.

The cycle of escalation soon continued when the IDF hit twelve target complexes inside Syria, including air defenses near Damascus and Deraa as well as three military sites where Iranian headquarters were present: Tal al-Mane, Dimas, and Tal Abu al-Thaalab. Altogether, Syria may have fired more than twenty SAMs, including SA-3s, SA-5s, SA-6s, and SA-17s. There is no evidence yet that Russian-operated missiles or radars assisted in the F-16 shootdown.

PRESSURING U.S. PARTNERS
On the night of February 7, a column of Iranian-led units fired artillery in the direction of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) south of Deir al-Zour, eight kilometers east of the Euphrates River deconfliction line established by Washington and Moscow. The column then advanced on the SDF position and the adjacent Tabiyah Gazirah oil fields, led by T-72 and T-55 tanks. According to a variety of social media and news reports, the force of around 500 troops included Afghan fighters from the IRGC-led militia Liwa Fatemiyoun; local Arab tribal auxiliaries recently recruited to the militia Liwa al-Baqir, led by Iranian officers; fighters from the Assad regime's National Defense Forces (NDF); along with Russian-equipped "Daesh hunter" auxiliary troops and Russian private military contractors from the Wagner Group.

U.S. airpower and artillery destroyed the attacking force, killing around a hundred personnel, including an estimated thirty NDF troops, forty other Syrians, and thirty Russian contractors (though some media reports claim the latter number was much larger, probably because they are counting Russian-equipped Syrians). Around twenty vehicles were also destroyed, including nine tanks. The U.S. military used overwhelming firepower to send a strong message, including F-15 and F-22 fighters, an AC-130 gunship, Apache helicopters, and Marine Corps artillery.

THE IRGC'S CALCULUS
The IRGC appears to have spearheaded both of these recent provocations, in line with its long track record of conducting drone operations inside Syria and its leading role in coordinating the Assad regime's offensive operations south of Deir al-Zour. The question is how the two tests are related, if at all.

One thing is clear: both incidents occurred against a background of growing Iranian confidence that the Syria intervention has saved the Assad regime, limited the United States to a tenuous foothold in the northeast, and allowed Tehran to establish a forward base of operations against Israel. The IRGC is now able to collect intelligence on Israel directly, reinforce and resupply Hezbollah by land, and potentially transform the Golan Heights into an active military front.

Moreover, while Syrian and Hezbollah drones have flown over Israel in the past, this is the first known incursion by an Iranian drone. The craft apparently entered Israeli airspace via northwest Jordan, perhaps to achieve surprise, create ambiguity about its point of origin, complicate Israel's response, and test Israeli defenses there. The fact that it was downed so quickly indicates that it was probably tracked prior to entering Israel, and that it lacked many of the stealth features of the American drone on which it was supposedly based (i.e., an RQ-170 captured by Iran in 2011). Technical exploitation of the wreckage will presumably clear up certain questions about the drone's mission and whether it was armed. Whatever the case, the incident demonstrates that Iran is now willing and able to use Syria as a base for operations inside Israel, marking a new phase in tensions between the two adversaries.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Both of the recent confrontations raise pressing questions about Iran's next moves and Russia's potential role:

Why did Iran undertake the drone mission? If the goal was intelligence gathering, Tehran could have deployed smaller drones of the type Hezbollah has already used to penetrate Israeli airspace. Instead it apparently chose an untested system, the Simorgh. Perhaps Israel's failure to down an intruding Hezbollah drone in July 2016 led IRGC officials to believe that a "stealthy" Simorgh could operate unhindered, especially with the element of surprise. They may also have been motivated to try it as a way of scoring propaganda points after the Deir al-Zour setback. At any rate, the drone appeared to fly at an altitude that would be considered unusually low for either a reconnaissance or strike mission.

Is Iran showing an increased propensity for risk taking? Although Tehran may have believed that the drone would proceed undetected, the operation was quite risky and unusual given the well-worn IRGC strategy of relying on proxies. How will the IDF strikes—which reportedly killed a number of Iranian personnel—affect Iran's risk-taking behavior in the future? And why did Hezbollah not respond on behalf of its patron?

In the past, Iran has often backed down when countered robustly, only to renew the challenge at a different place and time, sometimes with different means. The loss of Iranian personnel has opened a new blood account that the IRGC may seek to settle at a later date—though Hezbollah likely prefers to avoid escalation on Lebanon's border right now in light of the country's forthcoming elections. Despite domestic criticism of foreign entanglements during Iran's recent protests, the IRGC does not appear any less willing to intervene abroad.

What is Moscow's calculus? The Kremlin likely understood that Russian contract fighters were being used in the Deir al-Zour operation. Yet the Israeli Air Force chief of staff has said that Moscow was not involved in the drone incident, and that Russian authorities were informed at some point about Israel's retaliatory operations. Even so, Iran may have (mis)calculated that the presence of Russians in the Deir al-Zour probe and at Tiyas would deter Washington and Israel from responding.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the likelihood that Iran will continue testing American and Israeli redlines in Syria, the Trump administration should pursue a more coherent approach that includes the following measures:

Build on the credibility gained at Deir al-Zour by policing U.S. redlines more consistently. The United States might consider resuming strikes in response to future chemical weapons incidents; these could justifiably be broadened to include nearby Iranian or proxy elements supporting Assad regime forces. Moreover, strikes on high-value Iranian targets not directly connected to such provocations would further complicate Iran's calculations and make U.S. strikes less predictable.
Prepare for an indirect challenge to the U.S. presence in SDF areas. This may include Iranian pressure on Iraq to close down the U.S. supply line across the Tigris River. Beyond supporting moderate forces in Baghdad, Washington needs to establish a Turkish option for sustaining its presence in Syria, assuring Ankara that it will restrain the Kurdish elements that lead the SDF and press them to break ties with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
Support the southwestern opposition enclave in Deraa province. The IRGC and its allies may probe this area on the Jordanian border next, aiming to split it in two. The United States should therefore execute a limited, covert train-and-equip program for non-Salafist rebel groups there and elsewhere in Syria, as part of a wider effort to tie pro-regime elements down and limit their ability to make trouble for U.S. forces or neighboring states.
Reassure allies. This means continuing to support vigorous Israeli responses when Iran or Hezbollah challenge its sovereignty or security, and helping Jordan secure its airspace against Iranian incursions.
Publicly lay out the consequences of escalation. Washington should make clear that if Iranian forces or their proxies open a wider conflict with Israel, they might emerge so weakened as to jeopardize their hard-won gains against rebel forces in Syria.
Signal Russia that the United States will actively defend its interests in Syria. At the same time, Washington should work with Moscow on reenergizing diplomatic efforts to manage the Syria conflict and avoid embroiling the two countries in a dangerous confrontation of their own.


سخر معهد كاتو من مزاعم الولايات المتحدة بأن هجومها على قوات "موالية للحكومة السورية،" قبل أسابيع قليلة، يندرج تحت بند "الدفاع عن النفس،" قائلا "دفاعاً عن أي نفس .. إذ لم نلمس قيام نظام بشار الأسد بقصف ميناء بوسطن" مثلاً. وأضاف أن الجيش السوري بالمقابل "شن هجوماً على قاعدة سيطر عليها المسلحون السوريون منذ زمن، تواجد داخلها مستشارون عسكريون أميركيون." وأوضح أن الإدارة الأميركية حسمت أمرها لتواجد قواتها في سوريا "لأجل غير مسمى .. وتواجدها بكل تأكيد لم يأتِ بناءً على طلب الحكومة المضيفة؛ بل لم يصادق الكونغرس على نشرها بأي صيغة كانت."

America’s Creeping Regime Change in Syria

By John Glaser
This article appeared on the American Conservative on February 14, 2018.
In eastern Syria last week, American air and ground forces attacked Syrian pro-government military units, killing roughly 100 people, including some Russian advisors. U.S. Army Colonel Thomas Veale described the attack as “taken in self-defense.”

“Self-defense”? Had the regime of Bashar al-Assad bombarded Boston Harbor? No, but it had attacked a base, long held by Syrian rebels, with U.S. military advisors present. Despite the tit-for-tat chronology here, it’s hard to see how Veale’s “self-defense” claim is tenable.

After all, as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson explained last month, the Trump administration has committed to an indefinite military presence of roughly 2,000 U.S. boots on the Syrian battlefield. Are these troops present at the behest of the host government? Certainly not. Has Congress ratified their deployment in some way? Guess again. Are they there preempting an imminent threat of attack on America? Nope. Are they under the mandate of a UN Security Council resolution? No.

And you thought our government toppling days were over.
In fact, the U.S. military presence in Syria has no legal authorization whatsoever. Those American forces are cooperating with Syrian rebels to, as Tillerson put it, “help liberated peoples” in territory outside Assad’s control “stabilize their own communities” and defend themselves against regime forces. This is, he added, “a critical step to creating the conditions for a post-Assad political settlement.”

Dispensing with the euphemistic flummery, U.S. forces are engaged in a kind of creeping regime change operation — the lessons of recent history be damned.

One might fairly argue that the Assad regime, in its brutality against its own people, long ago forfeited the sovereign right to defend its territory against an invading foreign army. Fine, but we should be clear that Washington, in responding to the lawlessness, is also acting lawlessly — hardly a lodestar mission of the liberal, rules-based world order America claims to lead, and, in the big picture, decidedly not a case of “self-defense.”

Quaint legalisms aside, the clash between U.S. and Syrian forces should make clear just how dangerous our military presence in Syria is. This particular incident, we can reasonably assume, didn’t escalate only because the regime is desperate to avoid escalation. Were they to counterattack, the Syrians surely know, the full might of America would come crashing down upon Damascus, and that would be the end of them all.

But that is by no means a reassuring “balance of terror,” the term nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter used to describe the deterrence model of the Cold War’s mutually assured destruction. Indeed, the multi-sided chaos of the Syrian Civil War is neither balanced nor stable and the risk of escalation is very real. Should the actors in the next clash miscalculate, will the Russians defend their ally in Damascus before it falls, or will America’s “self-defense” spiral into the destruction of the regime? Will the resulting anarchy plunge us into a full-scale occupation? Will Turkey take advantage of the mayhem to rampage through Kurdish-held Syria? Will Iranian-backed militias still prioritize fighting Sunni extremist groups? If anything could reverse the defeat of the Islamic State, it is an escalation like this.

As with much of American foreign policy today, the threat to the United States in Syria is roughly proportional to the extent to which we choose to expose ourselves to it. None of the five missions Tillerson laid out for the U.S. military effort in Syria — to defeat ISIS and al-Qaeda, usher in a post-Assad state, counter Iranian influence, facilitate the return of refugees, and free Syria of weapons of mass destruction — are vital to protect America’s wealth and physical security.

Nor are these low-cost, low-risk, or high-probability-success missions. And as everyone knows, the last thing America needs now is a new set of elective, hazardous, and unachievable war aims on the other side of the globe.

America has an interest in a stable Middle East, and thus in a stable Syria, but the notion that U.S. policy has contributed to that end is rather dubious. The Islamic State, which exacerbated the Syrian Civil War by orders of magnitude, is, after all, an outgrowth of America’s war in Iraq. And the U.S. and its allies encouraged the Syrian rebellion from early on, an effort that was not only a spectacular failure but also fostered quite the opposite of stability.

An enduring feature of U.S. foreign policy is that each intervention, whether it is seen to fail or succeed, eventually serves to justify further intervention. While it’s true that the Islamic State has been decimated, thanks in part to the collective destructive power of Damascus, Tehran, Baghdad, Moscow, Washington, and various Kurdish and Syrian militias on the ground, it has been accomplished at great cost in blood and treasure. The answer to this near-Pyrrhic victory is not for Washington to invent new missions that lack legal authorization or a plausible timeline of success, but instead to reckon with its own role in this interminable tempest and acknowledge the very real possibility that backing away may be in the best interest of America and of Syria.


       استعادت مؤسسة هاريتاج السردية الرسمية حول إيران ووجودها في سوريا بأنه "يهدد الإقليم." وفي الدلائل أشارت المؤسسة إلى "مصادر إسرائيلية .. بأن طائرة الدرونز الإيرانية هي عبارة عن نسخة تمت هندستها عكسياً عن الطراز الأميركي RQ-170" والتي أسقطتها إيران داخل أجوائها عام 2011. وأضافت بأن "رسالة إسرائيل لكل من سوريا وإيران .. لن تصبر على التهديد المتنامي لإيران من سوريا."

Iran’s Moves in Syria Threaten Region

Hard to believe it’s even possible, but the Middle East got more troublesome over the weekend with the Israel Defense Forces’ shoot-down of an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle — a UAV, or “drone” — which violated Israeli airspace.

Israeli forces not only destroyed the Syria-based drone, they also reportedly launched a series of stinging air strikes against as many as a dozen Syrian and Iranian targets across the border in Syria.

According to Israel, the drone is a reverse-engineered copy of the stealthy U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel UAV lost over Iran in 2011. And though the immediate mission of the Iranian drone isn’t publicly known, Israel’s signal to Syria and Iran is quite clear.

That is: It won’t brook a growing Iranian threat from Syria.

Israel’s concern is well-founded. Iran could very well be setting up shop in Syria as the security situation there turns decidedly from dealing with ISIS to determining who will dominate this strategic Middle Eastern country.

Iran, understandably, wants to be the key outside power player in Syria.

For the mullahs, Syria is a fundamental building block — in addition to Iraq and Lebanon — in Tehran’s plans to cobble together a swath of power across the Middle East, spanning from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea.

Of course, as its closest ally, Tehran has long had clout in Damascus. But the Syrian regime’s indebtedness to the Iranian theocracy for rescuing it from the dustbin of history during the ongoing civil war runs deep.

The payback to Tehran could come in a persistent Iranian military presence in Syria. As it does in the real estate business, “location, location, location” also counts in security issues — big time.

Indeed, Iran would be able to project power against Israel from just across the Syrian border courtesy of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Quds force, offensive weapons and intelligence capabilities.

Having Iran in Syria also endangers neighboring Lebanon — the home of Tehran’s terror ally, Hezbollah. Iran could more efficiently and effectively support the terror group’s effort to dominate the country as well as threaten Israel to the South.

Think of it: The mullah’s missiles on the Mediterranean.

While seemingly running against the grain of Iran’s modern strategic culture for basing its forces abroad, the prospect of Tehran militarizing parts of Syria or Lebanon long-term is deeply alarming — to say the least.

Indeed, a quick look at the map shows that, if successful, Iran would have influence over of a big chunk of the Middle East, allowing Shiite, Persian Iran to threaten more Sunni Arab states and nearly encircle American ally, Israel.

There’s no question this isn’t good for U.S. interests either, but especially with U.S. forces deployed across the Middle East on counterterrorism missions; Iran is no fan of the United States.

Of course, the bloody, nearly 7-year-old Syrian civil war is probably far from over — not to mention that other major powers such as Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United States have a say in Syria’s future.

But considering this weekend’s drone incursion, it could be just the opening salvo of conflicts to come from an emboldened Tehran — meaning now would be a good time to assemble a coalition to pre-empt Iranian expansionism.
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التقرير الدوري لمراكز الابحاث الاميركية 23/2/2018 Empty
مُساهمةموضوع: رد: التقرير الدوري لمراكز الابحاث الاميركية 23/2/2018   التقرير الدوري لمراكز الابحاث الاميركية 23/2/2018 Emptyالسبت 24 فبراير 2018, 11:28 am

التقرير الدوري لمراكز الابحاث الاميركية 23/2/2018

نشرة دورية تصدر عن مركز الدراسات الأميركية والعربية

23 شباط - فبراير/‏ 2018  






اليمن


         استعرض مركز الدراسات الإستراتيجية والدولية معالم السياسة الأميركية في المنطقة متمثلة باستمرار انخراطها في "الشرق الأوسط،" والبناء عليها في اليمن، كما يستدل من تجربة سوريا والتي عمد "كبار المسؤولين الأميركيين إلى تسخير قسط كبير من الوقت للتعاون مع الحلفاء والتنسيق بالتناوب مع الخصوم ومواجهتم أيضاً." وأوضح المعهد أن "الأزمة اليمنية لا تختلف كثيراً" عن سوريا، فحلفاء الولايات المتحدة "يشعرون بالضعف، بينما تتنامى أعداد الإرهابيين، وتمضي إيران بالتدخل." ولفت الأنظار إلى البعد الإنساني في تدفق المهاجرين إلى اوروبا "التي تعتمد بشكل كبير على خطوط النقل البحري بالقرب من السواحل اليمنية."




The Yemen Model: The Future of U.S. Middle East Policy
February 21, 2018


Judging from Syria, the United States is still putting down stakes in the Middle East. At least 2,000 U.S. troops have an open-ended commitment to secure areas liberated from Islamic State group (ISG) rule. In Syria, senior U.S. officials put tremendous time into cooperating with allies and alternately coordinating with and countering adversaries.


At first glance, Yemen’s conflict is not so different. Surrounding U.S. allies feel vulnerable, terrorists are multiplying, and the Iranians are meddling. Syria’s refugees affect Europe, which also relies heavily on shipping that passes by the Yemeni coast. The human suffering generated by both conflicts is immense, and while Syria’s death toll is significantly steeper and its level of displacement is higher, Yemen has 1 million cholera cases and counting, as well as more than 8 million people suffering from severe food insecurity.


But those looking to see where U.S. Middle East policy is heading should look to Yemen, not Syria. In Yemen, the U.S. government has treated the conflict at arm’s length. It refuels allies’ warplanes, sells them armaments, and doesn’t do much else. The U.S. military carries out strikes on al Qaeda and ISG affiliates with Arab allies’ cooperation. The intensity of diplomacy one sees around Syria is absent, and it has been so since a flurry of U.S. engagement in the final months of the Obama administration. The governing assumptions seem to be that the United States shouldn’t second-guess its allies, the overall problem is intractable anyway, and the combatants need to work it out on their own. There is a new model for the United States in the Middle East, and that is it.


Allies seem slow to appreciate this, but the signs are clear. One can see them in the White House’s approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which continues to stress that whatever the parties agree to on their own will be agreeable to the United States. One can see them as well in President Donald Trump’s repetition of the idea that the United States has poured $7 trillion into the Middle East since 2001 with little to show for it. Neither politicians, policymakers, nor the public have challenged that view. Leaving aside the accuracy of the figure, the growing consensus is unmistakable: The Middle East has been a remarkably bad investment for the United States for the last 15 years, and investor patience has been exhausted.


If we take Yemen as a harbinger for U.S. Middle East policy, a number of consequences aren’t hard to imagine. The first is that U.S. assistance is likely to be scarcer. The U.S. insistence that it is done with funding reconstruction in Iraq, and will not engage in reconstruction funding in Syria, is just a foretaste. For wealthy U.S. allies that receive no aid, this is largely irrelevant, and Israel’s direct aid is likely secure. Yet, Israel is likely to feel the impact indirectly. Neighbors such as Egypt and Jordan that have enjoyed strong U.S. security support are likely to find it harder to come by in future years, and longstanding U.S. support for the Palestinian Authority (PA) will likely diminish as well. For decades, the United States has supported both the PA government and international organizations such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which have in turn helped support the Palestinian population. That relief, which also benefits Israeli security, seems imperiled.


Second, while the United States talks about countering Iranian efforts to spread its influence in the Middle East, it remains unwilling to engage directly in such efforts. In Syria in particular, it has been slow to address Iran’s military buildup and power projection capabilities. For many years, the United States has pushed to integrate regional defenses in the Gulf in order to deter Iran. Those efforts have slowed significantly, not least because Gulf Cooperation Council tensions have intruded, and the Trump administration has been unable to ease them.


Third, the United States seems to have diminishing interest in engaging in regional diplomacy, which has implications throughout the Middle East. This is not only a huge reversal in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, where U.S. diplomacy has been a constant for more than a half-century. From Morocco to the Gulf, the United States has been an essential partner, a security guarantor, and a scold against squabbling states. The impulse to mediate and manage regional conflicts seems to have diminished significantly.


Several effects are likely to follow from these trends. One is that the United States will have less influence over the shape of conflicts in the Middle East. Through its deep engagement, the United States for decades could influence alliances, incentivize positive behavior, and dissuade irresponsible actions. While it wasn’t always a recipe for comity, it did help even out many of the bumps in regional relations and help ease the isolation of U.S. partners from the regional order.


Another effect is that other powers are likely to have more influence in the region than they currently do. Not only will Russia and China help fill the vacuum, but so will Iran and perhaps even countries such as France and India. They will pursue policies that further their own agendas, and they will at times undermine U.S. interests.


U.S. global standing will likely suffer as well. Countries that rely on Middle East energy supplies also rely on the United States to secure their interests there. It’s true of potential adversaries such as China and also of close allies such as Japan and South Korea. U.S. influence with these countries is in part a product of U.S. influence in the Middle East. If the United States walks away from the latter, it will have to relinquish some of the former as well.


None of this is either inevitable or irreversible, but it is folly to say it is unthinkable. The changes underway in the U.S. approach to the Middle East will have repercussions. They will not just affect the region, but they will affect the United States and its global allies as well.


(This commentary originally appeared in the February issue of Middle East Notes and Comment, a newsletter of the CSIS Middle East Program.)


Jon B. Alterman is senior vice president, Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.


Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s)




افريقيا والتدخل الأميركي


         سعى معهد كارنيغي إلى استعراض ما يمكنه القول أن هناك صلة بين "تنامي تواجد الإرهابيين في إفريقيا مما يبرر توسع وانتشار القوات الأميركية؛" بالإشارة إلى مقتل عدد من أفراد القوات الخاصة الأميركية، في شهر تشرين الأول/اكتوبر 2017، في النيجر مما "أثار عاصفة سياسية" في واشنطن. وأوضح أن تواجد القوات الخاصة هناك كان "مفاجئاً للشعب الأميركي وللكونغرس" على السواء. وفنّد المعهد تصريحات أعضاء مجلس الشيوخ من الحزبين بالتظاهر بعدم المعرفة نظراً لأن الكونغرس صادق على إنشاء "قيادة القوات الأميركية لأفريقيا – أفريكوم، عام 2007، وما ترتب عليه من توسع مضطرد للقوات الأميركية ووجودها الأمني جنوبي الصحراء الإفريقية الكبرى."


Do Terrorist Trends in Africa Justify the U.S. Military’s Expansion?


In October 2017, attackers affiliated with the self-proclaimed Islamic State ambushed a small contingent of U.S. special operations forces in Niger. The resulting firefight left four U.S. soldiers dead and sparked a political firestorm. The soldiers’ presence in Niger seemed to catch the U.S. public and Congress by surprise. Senator Lindsey Graham, who sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee, admitted that he “didn’t know there [were] a thousand troops in Niger.” Senator Jack Reed, the ranking Democrat on the committee, was equally puzzled: “I think the administration has to be more clear about our role in Niger and our role in other areas in Africa and other parts of the globe.


But the senators should not have been taken aback. Since the creation of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007, the U.S. military has steadily expanded its security footprint in sub-Saharan Africa. Experts estimate that over 6,000 U.S. troops are currently stationed throughout the continent in approximately forty-six sites, which include forward operating bases, cooperative security locations (such as drone installations), and contingency locations.


Yet terrorist attacks have only moderately increased in sub-Saharan Africa since 2007 and have decreased significantly since the 2014–2015 peak. When the two deadliest organizations are removed from the analysis—al-Shabab and Boko Haram—the rise in terrorist incidents over the last decade is very modest. Moreover, few African insurgencies pose a direct threat to U.S. core interests. Most are regionally concentrated and relate to local grievances that have a largely  domestic focus. The scale and growth of the U.S. military response runs the risk of exacerbating rather than mitigating risks to the United States. Civilian efforts are more effective than military actions to prevent extremist groups’ mobilization and recruitment, yet U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration shows no signs of mounting a vigorous civilian-oriented strategy to address the challenges that do exist.


ASSESSING TERRORIST VIOLENCE IN AFRICA


Does the terrorist threat in Africa justify the response from the United States?1 A key justification offered is that terrorist violence is climbing at a rapid rate and that U.S. military assets are needed to contain the violence and preserve stability. Policymakers regularly cite statistics that show terrorist attacks in Africa have spiked from around 400 annually in 2007 to over 2,000 by 2016. In a 2015 speech, General Donald Bolduc, head of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), emphasized threats posed by the Islamic State, al-Shabab, the Lord’s Resistance Army, Boko Haram, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as well as the danger posed by “43 other illicit groups.” In an internal military report in 2016, Bolduc additionally asserted: “Africa’s challenges could create a threat that surpasses the threat that the United States currently faces from conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.”


Certainly, violence from terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa has escalated in the past decade. But a close look at the data from two authoritative databases—the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)—points to more modest increases than what U.S. policymakers and military officials routinely describe.2


The GTD specifically focuses on terrorist incidents, in contrast to the ACLED database, which records broader incidents of political violence. One of the GTD’s most notable findings is a decade-long increase in terrorist attacks and fatalities in Africa: from 114 attacks and 1,944 fatalities in 2006, to 2,051 attacks and 13,182 fatalities in 2016 (fatalities include both perpetrators and victims). Tightening the criteria to only include attacks that are unambiguously terrorist-related (via the “doubt terrorism proper” GTD filter) substantially lowers the numbers: terrorist incidents in 2006 drop to 101 with 1,880 fatalities and in 2016 fall to 1,612 incidents with 9,620 fatalities.


The data set also includes terrorist incidents linked to domestic insurgencies that have little impact on core U.S. interests—such as violence associated with South Sudan’s civil war or the Great Lakes region. Therefore, it is valuable to narrow the criteria to only include (1) unambiguous terrorist incidents and (2) incidents linked to active militant Islamist groups that directly impact core U.S. national security (this analysis uses criteria from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, or ACSS, to include the following organizations: AQIM and its affiliates, al-Shabab, Nusrat al-Islam, Boko Haram, the Islamic State and its affiliates, and related jihadi-inspired extremists).


Two noteworthy findings emerge. First, overall levels of terrorism on the continent drop much further—by an additional 50 percent in 2016. Terrorist incidents in 2006 fall to thirty-five with 122 fatalities. The number of incidents in 2016 falls to 801 with 4,536 fatalities. Second, the data also show that terrorist incidents rise steadily through 2014—where they hit a peak of 1,202 attacks and 16,176 casualties—before sharply plummeting.


Despite using a broader definitional rubric of political violence, the ACLED database reveals similar trends. Narrowing the ACLED’s criteria to only include incidents involving militant Islamist groups shows forty-one attacks in 2006 with thirty-seven fatalities. This climbs to a peak of 15,791 fatalities in 2015 (from 2,129 incidents), before falling steeply in 2017 to 8,386 fatalities (from 2,498 incidents).






نتنياهو أمام القضاء


         استعرض معهد واشنطن تحقيقات "الرشوة والإحتيال وخيانة الأمانة" الصادرة بحق بنيامين نتنياهو من قبل جهازالشرطة والمدعي العام، وسعيه المحموم "لدحض الاتهامات .. في حين لم يكن دفاعه مقنعاً واعتبر بأنه يحاول إضعاف مؤسسة رئيسية لإنفاذ القانون." واعتبر المعهد أن مساعي نتنياهو تدل على أنه "أدرك إمكانية أن يكون مصيره السياسي في يد محكمة الرأي العام .." وحث المعهد "مختلف أعضاء الإئتلاف الحاكم أن يقرروا الآن ما بين البقاء في الحكومة أو الانسحاب منها .. دون انتظار صدور توصية سلبية (بحق نتنياهو) من الشرطة؛ أو المراهنة عليه لإجراء انتخابات مبكرة لاستعراض قوته السياسية أمام المؤسسة القانونية." يشار إلى أن الإئتلاف الذي يتزعمه نتنياهو لديه 67 عضواً في "الكنيست" من مجموع 120. وشدد المعهد على تشبث نتنياهو "بقاعدته اليمينية للحد من التداعيات على السياسة مع الولايات المتحدة؛" مستطرداً أن "إحراز تقدم في خطة السلام المحتضرة مستبعدة أكثر من السابق."






The Netanyahu Probe and the Court of Public Opinion


New corruption charges pose a more serious challenge to the prime minister than past investigations, but public reaction in Israel may determine whether he can stay afloat until the next elections.


Binyamin Netanyahu's political future hangs in the balance after police officials recommended to the attorney general on February 13 that he be indicted on two separate cases involving bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. In one case, the prime minister is accused of accepting $280,000 worth of gifts from individuals in return for advancing their interests. In the other, he is accused of taking steps to weaken one newspaper in return for favorable coverage in another.


Within minutes of the move, Netanyahu appeared on national television to dismiss the allegations, stating that the police are biased against him and reminding viewers about his long record of military and government service. In response, critics argued that he was undermining a key law enforcement agency. The speech is a sign that Netanyahu realizes his political fate may rest with the court of public opinion even if his legal fate winds up in the hands of the courts.


POLITICIANS AND POLLS
The various members of Netanyahu's governing coalition, including some of his rivals, must now decide whether to stay or bolt. With politicians keeping a close eye on the polls, how the public internalizes the severity of the allegations could become very relevant. It is unclear whether Israeli opinion on Tuesday's announcement will be swayed by two other pending cases linked to Netanyahu. For now, police say he is not an official target of their probe into the most financially lucrative case, which involves corruption allegations related to his brother-in-law's role as a lawyer in the government's purchase of German submarines worth up to $2.5 billion.


Netanyahu's most prominent colleagues and rivals—including Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon and Education Minister Naftali Bennett—say that they will not take a stand on the matter until Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit decides whether to indict. Such noncommittal statements have fueled speculation that political leaders are waiting to see how the public reacts, though Bennett subsequently chided Netanyahu for taking gifts from American billionaires.


During the author's recent visit to Israel, it was clear that Netanyahu's political associates had been carefully planning for this situation amid widespread anticipation of a negative police recommendation. One top advisor admitted that Kachlon, a vocal proponent of clean government, was the prime minister's wobbliest supporter. Kachlon leads 10 of the 67 members in Netanyahu's coalition, which controls the 120-member parliament by a slim margin. According to the advisor, Kachlon pledged last month that he would not bring down the government based on a police recommendation alone, though he pointedly refused to give assurances about how he would react if Mandelblit leaned toward indictments. His wavering is no small matter given his well-known desire for the government to complete its term, giving him enough time to fulfill his 2015 campaign pledge on lowering the cost of apartments for young families.


LEGAL AND POLITICAL TIMETABLES
Israeli law mandates that Netanyahu would be entitled to a hearing if Mandelblit makes an initial recommendation to charge him in either case; the indictment would not be formalized until after the hearing. The prime minister's political advisor and other close associates believe he would probably be forced to step down if said hearing does not go well. Yet his team is clearly counting on the fact that the entire process could take as long as a year—nearly the same amount of time his government has before finishing its term and facing mandatory elections.


Negative public reaction could speed up the process, however. Yoaz Hendel, a columnist who once worked for Netanyahu, has said that the people will not allow Mandelblit to delay the cases given their heightened interest in the matter.


Public opinion could affect Netanyahu's calculations as well. His February 13 statement suggested he will continue doing his job "faithfully and responsibly," but if his advisors believe the people are largely supportive, he would not rule out preempting potential indictments by calling for early elections as a show of political force to the legal establishment. In their view, the question of whether the alleged $280,000 in gifts actually affected Netanyahu's decisions remains a gray zone, so they are hoping this uncertainty will sway Mandelblit, a former senior aide to the prime minister. Yet this kind of political calculus might be clutching at straws.


One thing is clear: Netanyahu has been the great survivor of Israeli politics, and if he remains in power until next year, he will be the longest-serving leader in the country's history. He may be counting on the widespread perception that he has yet to groom a successor; indeed, he has fallen out with various top officials in recent years, including Gideon Saar and Moshe Yaalon. He seems determined to persevere even if rivals to his right (Bennett) and left (Yair Lapid and Avi Gabbay) pick up points in the polls at his expense.


The size and durability of any point changes will be closely scrutinized by politicians and the public alike. A poll taken immediately after the police recommendation indicated that 48 percent of respondents want Netanyahu to resign, a decrease from the 60 percent tallied in response to a similar question in December. Although Netanyahu may take solace in that decrease, instant polls are often unreliable, and even if the latest one is accurate, 48 percent is a large number.


THE OLMERT PRECEDENT
Netanyahu also appears to be counting on the fact there is no explicit provision for an indicted prime minister to step down. In 1993, Israel's Supreme Court ruled that cabinet ministers have to step down if indicted, but the situation is more complex in the case of a premier, whose departure would presumably trigger the resignation of the entire cabinet.


It should be recalled that when a similar situation arose in 2008—the year Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stepped down amid corruption charges—it was not a legal requirement that forced him out. Rather, it was the strident role played by Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who said that the allegations made it untenable for Olmert to remain in office well before any indictments were issued. So far, no equivalent of Barak has emerged in the current government, though Netanyahu himself strongly condemned Olmert after the police recommended indicting him in 2008, declaring, "He does not have a public or moral mandate to determine such fateful matters for the state of Israel when there is the fear—and I have to say it is real and not without basis—that he will make decisions based on his personal interest in political survival and not based on the national interest."


POLICY IMPACT
In the wake of this week's announcement, observers may question whether Netanyahu's decisions on matters of war and peace will be affected by his personal legal situation. As it turns out, he has been famously risk-averse on such matters throughout his tenure. Since his first round as prime minister in 1996, he has largely avoided using ground troops in battle (with one exception—when he feared Hamas had been tunneling into Israel during the Gaza war of 2014).


In addition, the Israeli parliamentary system differs from the American presidential system in that it gives the security establishment a more prominent role in military decisionmaking. For instance, if the situation in Syria escalates following last weekend's incidents between Israel and Iran, any major decision from Jerusalem would require full involvement of the military and inner cabinet, not just Netanyahu.


As for U.S. policy implications, Netanyahu will no doubt rely even more heavily on his right-wing base to maintain support during this period, which could make him more vulnerable to pressure on issues of concern to them (e.g., unilaterally annexing the West Bank settlement of Maale Adumim). Therefore, the notion of making progress on the Trump administration's moribund peace plan is now even more far-fetched, especially at a time when the Palestinians are boycotting U.S. officials. Regarding Iran policy, Netanyahu will surely continue urging President Trump to either "fix or nix" the nuclear deal, though the actual impact of his exhortations remains uncertain
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التقرير الدوري لمراكز الابحاث الاميركية 23/2/2018
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