الحرب الباردة
الوفد المصري إلى مؤتمر بريتون وودز يحييه ضابط من قيادة النقل الجوي في سلاح الجو الأمريكي لدى وصولهم بالطائرة. من اليسار إلى اليمين: جيمس كريگ، المستشار الاقتصادي للمجموعة؛ السيدة آن فرانسس كاريت، سكرتيرة؛ أحمد سليم من وزارة المالية المصرية، وكان عضواً في الوفد؛ سامي اللقاني، نائب وزير ورئيس جهاز المحاسبة العام، ورئيس الوفد المصري؛ ليوتنانت كرنل ماگنس آلتماير، من قيادة النقل الجوي؛ محمود الفلكي من وزارة المالية المصرية، وعضو الوفد؛ وليون ديشي، سكرتير.
In 1945, Roosevelt and Churchill prepared the postwar era by negotiating with يوسف ستالين at يالطا about respective zones of influence; this same year Germany was divided into four occupation zones (Soviet, American, British, and French).
Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau insisted that the Big Four (United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China) participate in the Bretton Woods conference in 1944,[13] but their goal was frustrated when the Soviet Union would not join the IMF. In the past, the reasons why the Soviet Union chose not to subscribe to the articles by December 1945 have been the subject of speculation. But since the release of relevant Soviet archives, it is now clear that the Soviet calculation was based on the behavior of the parties that had actually expressed their assent to the Bretton Woods Agreements.[بحاجة لمصدر] The extended debates about ratification that had taken place both in the UK and the U.S. were read in Moscow as evidence of the quick disintegration of the wartime alliance.[بحاجة لمصدر]
Facing the Soviet Union, whose power had also strengthened and whose territorial influence had expanded, the U.S. assumed the role of leader of the capitalist camp. The rise of the postwar U.S. as the world's leading industrial, monetary, and military power was rooted in the fact that the mainland U.S. was untouched by the war, in the instability of the national states in postwar Europe, and the wartime devastation of the Soviet and European economies.
Despite the economic effort imposed by such a policy, being at the center of the international market gave the U.S. unprecedented freedom of action in pursuing its foreign affairs goals. A trade surplus made it easier to keep armies abroad and to invest outside the U.S., and because other nations could not sustain foreign deployments, the U.S. had the power to decide why, when and how to intervene in global crises. The dollar continued to function as a compass to guide the health of the world economy, and exporting to the U.S. became the primary economic goal of developing or redeveloping economies. This arrangement came to be referred to as the Pax Americana, in analogy to the Pax Britannica of the late 19th century and the Pax Romana of the first. (See Globalism)
أحدث تطبيق
أزمة ميزان المدفوعات الأمريكي
After the end of World War II, the U.S. held $26 billion in gold reserves, of an estimated total of $40 billion (approx 65%). As world trade increased rapidly through the 1950s, the size of the gold base increased by only a few percentage points. In 1950, the U.S. balance of payments swung negative. The first U.S. response to the crisis was in the late 1950s when the Eisenhower administration placed import quotas on oil and other restrictions on trade outflows. More drastic measures were proposed, but not acted upon. However, with a mounting recession that began in 1958, this response alone was not sustainable. In 1960, with Kennedy's election, a decade-long effort to maintain the Bretton Woods System at the $35/ounce price was begun.
The design of the Bretton Woods System was that nations could only enforce gold convertibility on the anchor currency—the United States’ dollar. Gold convertibility enforcement was not required, but instead, allowed. Nations could forgo converting dollars to gold, and instead hold dollars. Rather than full convertibility, it provided a fixed price for sales between central banks. However, there was still an open gold market. For the Bretton Woods system to remain workable, it would either have to alter the peg of the dollar to gold, or it would have to maintain the free market price for gold near the $35 per ounce official price. The greater the gap between free market gold prices and central bank gold prices, the greater the temptation to deal with internal economic issues by buying gold at the Bretton Woods price and selling it on the open market.
In 1960 Robert Triffin, Belgian American economist, noticed that holding dollars was more valuable than gold because constant U.S. balance of payments deficits helped to keep the system liquid and fuel economic growth. What would later come to be known as Triffin's Dilemma was predicted when Triffin noted that if the U.S. failed to keep running deficits the system would lose its liquidity, not be able to keep up with the world's economic growth, and, thus, bring the system to a halt. But incurring such payment deficits also meant that, over time, the deficits would erode confidence in the dollar as the reserve currency created instability.[14]
The first effort was the creation of the London Gold Pool on 1 November 1961 between eight nations. The theory behind the pool was that spikes in the free market price of gold, set by the morning gold fix in London, could be controlled by having a pool of gold to sell on the open market, that would then be recovered when the price of gold dropped. Gold's price spiked in response to events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, and other smaller events, to as high as $40/ounce. The Kennedy administration drafted a radical change of the tax system to spur more production capacity and thus encourage exports. This culminated with the 1963 tax cut program, designed to maintain the $35 peg.
In 1967, there was an attack on the pound and a run on gold in the sterling area, and on 18 November 1967, the British government was forced to devalue the pound.[15] U.S. President Lyndon Baines Johnson was faced with a brutal choice, either institute protectionist measures, including travel taxes, export subsidies and slashing the budget—or accept the risk of a "run on gold" and the dollar. From Johnson's perspective: "The world supply of gold is insufficient to make the present system workable—particularly as the use of the dollar as a reserve currency is essential to create the required international liquidity to sustain world trade and growth."[16]
He believed that the priorities of the United States were correct, and, although there were internal tensions in the Western alliance, that turning away from open trade would be more costly, economically and politically, than it was worth: "Our role of world leadership in a political and military sense is the only reason for our current embarrassment in an economic sense on the one hand and on the other the correction of the economic embarrassment under present monetary systems will result in an untenable position economically for our allies."[بحاجة لمصدر]
While West Germany agreed not to purchase gold from the U.S., and agreed to hold dollars instead, the pressure on both the dollar and the pound sterling continued. In January 1968 Johnson imposed a series of measures designed to end gold outflow, and to increase U.S. exports. This was unsuccessful, however, as in mid-March 1968 a run on gold ensued, the London Gold Pool was dissolved, and a series of meetings attempted to rescue or reform the existing system.[17] But, as long as the U.S. commitments to foreign deployment continued, particularly to Western Europe, there was little that could be done to maintain the gold peg.[بحاجة لمصدر][original research?]
All attempts to maintain the peg collapsed in November 1968, and a new policy program attempted to convert the Bretton Woods system into an enforcement mechanism of floating the gold peg, which would be set by either fiat policy or by a restriction to honor foreign accounts. The collapse of the gold pool and the refusal of the pool members to trade gold with private entities—on 18 March, 1968 the Congress of the United States repealed the 25% requirement of gold backing of the dollar[18]—as well as the US pledge to suspend gold sales to governments that trade in the private markets,[19] led to the expansion of the private markets for international gold trade, in which the price of gold rose much higher than the official dollar price.[20] [21] The US gold reserves continued to be depleted due to the actions of some nations, notably France,[21] who continued to build up their gold reserves.
التغيرات الهيكلية
العودة للتحويل
In the 1960s and 1970s, important structural changes eventually led to the breakdown of international monetary management. One change was the development of a high level of monetary interdependence. The stage was set for monetary interdependence by the return to convertibility of the Western European currencies at the end of 1958 and of the Japanese yen in 1964. Convertibility facilitated the vast expansion of international financial transactions, which deepened monetary interdependence.
نمو أسواق العملة الدولية
Another aspect of the internationalization of banking has been the emergence of international banking consortia. Since 1964 various banks had formed international syndicates, and by 1971 over three quarters of the world's largest banks had become shareholders in such syndicates. Multinational banks can and do make huge international transfers of capital not only for investment purposes but also for hedging and speculating against exchange rate fluctuations.
These new forms of monetary interdependence made possible huge capital flows. During the Bretton Woods era countries were reluctant to alter exchange rates formally even in cases of structural disequilibria. Because such changes had a direct impact on certain domestic economic groups, they came to be seen as political risks for leaders. As a result official exchange rates often became unrealistic in market terms, providing a virtually risk-free temptation for speculators. They could move from a weak to a strong currency hoping to reap profits when a revaluation occurred. If, however, monetary authorities managed to avoid revaluation, they could return to other currencies with no loss. The combination of risk-free speculation with the availability of huge sums was highly destabilizing.
التراجع
تأثير الهيمنة الأمريكية
A second structural change that undermined monetary management was the decline of U.S. hegemony. The U.S. was no longer the dominant economic power it had been for more than two decades. By the mid-1960s, the E.E.C. and Japan had become international economic powers in their own right. With total reserves exceeding those of the U.S., with higher levels of growth and trade, and with per capita income approaching that of the U.S., Europe and Japan were narrowing the gap between themselves and the United States.
The shift toward a more pluralistic distribution of economic power led to increasing dissatisfaction with the privileged role of the U.S. dollar as the international currency. As in effect the world's central banker, the U.S., through its deficit, determined the level of international liquidity. In an increasingly interdependent world, U.S. policy greatly influenced economic conditions in Europe and Japan. In addition, as long as other countries were willing to hold dollars, the U.S. could carry out massive foreign expenditures for political purposes—military activities and foreign aid—without the threat of balance-of-payments constraints.
Dissatisfaction with the political implications of the dollar system was increased by détente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat had been an important force in cementing the Western capitalist monetary system. The U.S. political and security umbrella helped make American economic domination palatable for Europe and Japan, which had been economically exhausted by the war. As gross domestic production grew in European countries, trade grew. When common security tensions lessened, this loosened the transatlantic dependence on defence concerns, and allowed latent economic tensions to surface.
الدولار
Reinforcing the relative decline in U.S. power and the dissatisfaction of Europe and Japan with the system was the continuing decline of the dollar—the foundation that had underpinned the post-1945 global trading system. The حرب ڤيتنام and the refusal of the administration of U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson to pay for it and its Great Society programs through taxation resulted in an increased dollar outflow to pay for the military expenditures and rampant inflation, which led to the deterioration of the U.S. balance of trade position.[بحاجة لمصدر] In the late 1960s, the dollar was overvalued with its current trading position, while the Deutsche Mark and the yen were undervalued; and, naturally, the Germans and the Japanese had no desire to revalue and thereby make their exports more expensive, whereas the U.S. sought to maintain its international credibility by avoiding devaluation.[22] Meanwhile, the pressure on government reserves was intensified by the new international currency markets, with their vast pools of speculative capital moving around in search of quick profits.[21]
In contrast, upon the creation of Bretton Woods, with the U.S. producing half of the world's manufactured goods and holding half its reserves, the twin burdens of international management and the Cold War were possible to meet at first. Throughout the 1950s Washington sustained a balance of payments deficit to finance loans, aid, and troops for allied regimes. But during the 1960s the costs of doing so became less tolerable. By 1970 the U.S. held under 16% of international reserves. Adjustment to these changed realities was impeded by the U.S. commitment to fixed exchange rates and by the U.S. obligation to convert dollars into gold on demand.[بحاجة لمصدر]
عجز اتفاقية النقد الدولية
نظام التعويم 1968–1972
By 1968, the attempt to defend the dollar at a fixed peg of $35/ounce, the policy of the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations, had become increasingly untenable. Gold outflows from the U.S. accelerated, and despite gaining assurances from Germany and other nations to hold gold, the unbalanced fiscal spending of the Johnson administration had transformed the dollar shortage of the 1940s and 1950s into a dollar glut by the 1960s. In 1967, the IMF agreed in Rio de Janeiro to replace the tranche division set up in 1946. Special drawing rights (SDRs) were set as equal to one U.S. dollar, but were not usable for transactions other than between banks and the IMF. Nations were required to accept holding SDRs equal to three times their allotment, and interest would be charged, or credited, to each nation based on their SDR holding. The original interest rate was 1.5%.
The intent of the SDR system was to prevent nations from buying pegged gold and selling it at the higher free market price, and give nations a reason to hold dollars by crediting interest, at the same time setting a clear limit to the amount of dollars that could be held. The essential conflict was that the American role as military defender of the capitalist world's economic system was recognized, but not given a specific monetary value. In effect, other nations "purchased" American defense policy by taking a loss in holding dollars. They were only willing to do this as long as they supported U.S. military policy. Because of the Vietnam War and other unpopular actions, the pro-U.S. consensus began to evaporate. The SDR agreement, in effect, monetized the value of this relationship, but did not create a market for it.
The use of SDRs as paper gold seemed to offer a way to balance the system, turning the IMF, rather than the U.S., into the world's central banker. The U.S. tightened controls over foreign investment and currency, including mandatory investment controls in 1968. In 1970, U.S. President Richard Nixon lifted import quotas on oil in an attempt to reduce energy costs; instead, however, this exacerbated dollar flight, and created pressure from petro-dollars. Still, the U.S. continued to draw down reserves. In 1971 it had a reserve deficit of $56 billion; as well, it had depleted most of its non-gold reserves and had only 22% gold coverage of foreign reserves. In short, the dollar was tremendously overvalued with respect to gold.
صدمة نيكسون
المقالة الرئيسية: صدمة نيكسون
By the early 1970s, as the Vietnam War accelerated inflation, the United States as a whole began running a trade deficit. The crucial turning point was 1970, which saw U.S. gold coverage deteriorate from 55% to 22%. This, in the view of neoclassical economists, represented the point where holders of the dollar had lost faith in the ability of the U.S. to cut budget and trade deficits.
In 1971 more and more dollars were being printed in Washington, then being pumped overseas, to pay for government expenditure on the military and social programs. In the first six months of 1971, assets for $22 billion fled the U.S. In response, on 15 August 1971, Nixon issued قالب:Executive Order pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, unilaterally imposing 90-day wage and price controls, a 10% import surcharge, and most importantly "closed the gold window", making the dollar inconvertible to gold directly, except on the open market. Unusually, this decision was made without consulting members of the international monetary system or even his own State Department, and was soon dubbed the Nixon Shock.
The surcharge was dropped in December 1971 as part of a general revaluation of major currencies, which were henceforth allowed 2.25% devaluations from the agreed exchange rate. But even the more flexible official rates could not be defended against the speculators. By March 1976, all the major currencies were floating—in other words, exchange rates were no longer the principal method used by governments to administer monetary policy.
اتفاقية سميثسونيان
The shock of 15 August was followed by efforts under U.S. leadership to develop a new system of international monetary management. Throughout the fall of 1971, there was a series of multilateral and bilateral negotiations of the Group of Ten seeking to develop a new multilateral monetary system.
On 17 and 18 December 1971, the Group of Ten, meeting in the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, created the Smithsonian Agreement, which devalued the dollar to $38/ounce, with 2.25% trading bands, and attempted to balance the world financial system using SDRs alone. It was criticized at the time, and was by design a "temporary" agreement. It failed to impose discipline on the U.S. government, and with no other credibility mechanism in place, the pressure against the dollar in gold continued.
This resulted in gold becoming a floating asset, and in 1971 it reached $44.20/ounce, in 1972 $70.30/ounce and still climbing. By 1972, currencies began abandoning even this devalued peg against the dollar, though it took a decade for all of the industrialized nations to do so. In February 1973 the Bretton Woods currency exchange markets closed, after a last-gasp devaluation of the dollar to $44/ounce, and reopened in March in a floating currency regime.
بريتون وودز الثاني
المقالة الرئيسية: بريتون وودز الثاني
Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber have referred to the monetary system of today as Bretton Woods II.[23] They argue that in the early 2000s (decade), like 40 years earlier, the international system is composed of a core issuing the dominant international currency, and a periphery. The periphery is committed to export-led growth based on the maintenance of an undervalued exchange rate. In the 1960s, the core was the United States and the periphery was Europe and Japan. This old periphery has since graduated, and the new periphery is Asia. The core remains the same, the United States. The argument is that a system of pegged currencies, in which the periphery export capital to the core that provides a financial intermediary role is both stable and desirable, although this notion is controversial.[23]
نظام بريتون وودز بعد أزمة 2008
In the wake of the Global financial crisis of 2008, policymakers and others have called for a new international monetary system that some of them also dub Bretton Woods II. On the other side, this crisis has revived the debate about Bretton Woods II.[Notes 5]
On 26 September 2008, French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, said, "we must rethink the financial system from scratch, as at Bretton Woods.”[24]
On 24–25 September 2009 US President Obama hosted the G20 in Pittsburgh. A realignment of currency exchange rates was proposed. This meeting's policy outcome could be known as the Pittsburgh Agreement of 2009, where deficit nations may devalue their currencies and surplus nations may revalue theirs upward.
In March 2010, Prime Minister Papandreou of Greece wrote an op-ed in the International Herald Tribune, in which he said: "Democratic governments worldwide must establish a new global financial architecture, as bold in its own way as Bretton Woods, as bold as the creation of the European Community and European Monetary Union. And we need it fast." In interviews coinciding with his meeting with President Obama, he indicated that Obama would raise the issue of new regulations for the international financial markets at the next G20 meetings in June and November 2010.
Over the course of the crisis the IMF progressively relaxed its stance on "free market" principles such as its guidance against using capital controls. In 2011 the IMF's managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn stated that boosting employment and equity "must be placed at the heart" of the IMF's policy agenda. [25] The World Bank indicated a switch towards greater emphases on job creation.[26] [27]
التراث الأكاديمي
أدى إنهيار نظام بريتون وودز إلى دراسة اقتصاديات المصداقية كحقل متميز، وبروز نماذج الاقتصاد الكلي، مثل نموذج مندل-فلمينگ.[بحاجة لمصدر]
أسعار الصرف
التواريخ الموضحة هي حسب تاريخ ورودها؛ "*" يشير لمعدل التعويم حسب صندوق النقد الدولي[28]
الين الياباني
التاريخ # ين=1 دولار أمريكي
أغسطس 1946 15
12 مارس 1947 50
5 يوليو 1948 270
25 أبريل 1949 360
20 يوليو 1971 308
30 ديسمبر 1998 115.60*
5 ديسمبر 2008 92.499*
19 مارس 2011 80.199*
3 أغسطس 2011 77.250*
ملاحظة: ن.م.إ. في 2007 كان 4.272 تريليون دولار أمريكي[29]
المارك الألماني
التاريخ # مارك = دولار أمريكي الهوامش
21 يونيو 1948 3.33 1.7026 يورو
18 سبتمبر 1949 4.20 2.1474 يورو
6 مارس 1961 4 2.0452 يورو
29 أكتوبر 1969 3.67 1.8764 يورو
30 ديسمبر 1998 1.673* آخر يوم للتداول، تحول لليورو (4 يناير 1999)
ملاحظة: ن.م.إ. في 2007 كان 5.49 تريليون دولار أمريكي[29]
الجنيه الإسترليني
التاريخ # جنيه= 1 دولار أمريكي
27 ديسمبر 1945 0.2481
18 سبتمبر 1949 0.3571
17 نوفمبر 1967 0.4167
30 ديسمبر 1998 0.598*
5 ديسمبر 2008 0.681*
ملاحظة: ن.م.إ. في 2007 كان 2.1 تريليون دولار[29]
الفرنك الفرنسي
التاريخ # فرنك= 1 دولار أمريكي الهوامش
27 ديسمبر 1945 1.1911 1 جنيه إسترليني = 4.8 فرنك
26 يناير 1948 2.1439 1 جنيه إسترليني = 8.64 فرنك
18 أكتوبر 1948 2.6352 1 جنيه إسترليني = 10.62 فرنك
27 أبريل 1949 2.7221 1 جنيه إسترليني = 10.97 فرنك
20 سبتمبر 1949 3.5 1 جنيه إسترليني= 9.8 فرنك
11 أغسطس 1957 4.2 £1 = 11.76 FRF
27 ديسمبر 1958 4.9371 1 FRF = 0.18 گ ذهب
1 يناير 1960 4.9371 1 الفرنك الجديد = 100 فرنك قديم
10 أغسطس 1969 5.55 1 الفرنك الجديد = 0.160 گ ذهب
31 ديسمبر 1998 5.627* آخر يوم للتداول؛ تحول لليورو (4 يناير 1999)
ملاحظة : ن.م.إ. في 2007 كان 13.611 تريليون دولار أمريكي[29]
الليرة الإيطالية
التاريخ # ليرة= 1 دولار أمريكي الهوامش
4 يناير 1946 225 0.1162 يورو
26 مارس 1946 509 0.2629 يورو
7 يناير 1947 350 0.1808 يورو
28 نوفمبر 1947 575 0.297 يورو
18 سبتمبر 1949 625 0.3228 يورو
31 ديسمبر 1998 1,654.569* آخر يوم للتداول؛ تحول لليورو (4 يناير 1999)
ملاحظة: ن.م.إ. في 2007 كان 3.485 تريليون دولار أمريكي[29]
الپـِسـِتا الإسپاني
Date # پـِسـِتا= 1 دولار أمريكي Note
17 يوليو 1959 60 0.3606 يورو
20 نوفمبر 1967 70 انخفضت بما يتماشى مع الجنيه الإسترليني
31 ديسمبر 1998 142.734* آخر يوم للتداول؛ تحول لليورو (4 يناير 1999)
ملاحظة: ن.م.إ. في 2007 كان 299.495 تريليون دولار[29]
الگلدر الهولندي
التاريخ # الگلدر= 1 دولار أمريكي الهوامش
27 ديسمبر 1945 2.652 1.2034 يورو
20 سبتمبر 1949 3.8 1.7244 يورو
7 مارس 1961 3.62 1.6427 يورو
31 ديسمبر 1998 1.888* آخر يوم للتداول؛ تحول لليورو (4 يناير 1999)
ملاحظة: ن.م.إ. في 2007 كان 26.019 تريليون دولار[29]
الفرنك البلجيكي
التاريخ # فرنك= 1 دولار أمريكي الهوامش
27 ديسمبر 1945 43.77 1.085 يورو
1946 43.8725 1.0876 يورو
21 سبتمبر 1949 50 1.2395 يورو
31 ديسمبر 1998 34.605* آخر يوم للتداول؛ تحول لليورو (4 يناير 1999)
ملاحظة: ن.م.إ. في 2007 كان 15.168 تريليون دولار أمريكي[29]
الدراخمة اليوناني
التاريخ # دراخمة= 1 دولار أمريكي الهوامش
1954 30 0.088 يورو
31 ديسمبر 2000 281.821* آخر يوم للتداول؛ تحول لليورو (2001)
ملاحظة: ن.م.إ. في 2007 كان 111.425 بليون دولار أمريكي[29]
الفرنك السويسري
التاريخ # فرنك=1 دولار أمريكي الهوامش
27 ديسمبر 1945 4.30521 1 جنيه إسترليني = 17.35 فرنك
سبتمبر 1949 4.375 1 جنيه إسترليني = 12.25 فرنك
31 ديسمبر 1998 1.377* 1 جنيه إسترليني = 2.289 فرنك
5 ديسمبر 2008 1.211* 1 جنيه إسترليني= 1.778 فرنك
ملاحظة: ن.م.إ في 2007 كان 0.303 تريليون دولار أمريكي[29]
الكرونة الدنماركية
التاريخ # كرونة = 1 دولار أمريكي الهوامش
أغسطس 1945 4.8
19 سبتمبر 1949 6.91 انخفضت بما يتماشى مع الجنيه الإسترليني
21 نوفمبر 1967 7.5
31 ديسمبر 1998 6.392*
5 ديسمبر 2008 5.882*
ملاحظة: ن.م.إ في كان 0.203 تريليون دولار أمريكي[29]
الماركا الفنلندية
التاريخ # الماركا= 1 دولار أمريكي الهوامش
17 أكتوبر 1945 1.36 يورو 0.2287
5 يوليو 1949 1.6 يورو 0.2691
19 سبتمبر 1949 2.3 يورو 0.3868
15 سبتمبر 1957 3.2 يورو 0.5382
1 يناير 1963 3.2 1 الماركا الجديدة = 100 الماركا القديمة
12 أكتوبر 1967 4.2 يورو 0.7064
30 ديسمبر 1998 5.084* آخر يوم للتداول، تحولت لليورو؛ (4 يناير 1999)
ملاحظة: ن.م.إ في 2007 كان 1.118 تريليون دولار أمريكي
الرئيسية 
البوابة 
