تنبؤات مركز "ستراتفور" للشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا

A Spat Among Allies Engulfs the Middle East

As the second quarter comes to an end, Qatar's dispute with a handful of its peers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has captivated the rest of the international community. But their differences will go unresolved in the next quarter as the spat lays bare the enduring fault lines within the counterterrorism alliance that the United States — and the GCC's de facto leader, Saudi Arabia — had hoped would manage the Middle East's many conflicts. As the kingdom tries to assert its authority among its fellow Gulf states by subduing Doha's independent streak, Qatar will fight to keep the unique foreign policy niche it has carved for itself beyond the edges of Saudi Arabia's shadow.
The United States' role in the region will do much to shape the standoff's outcome. On one hand, Saudi Arabia and its ally, the United Arab Emirates, have confidence in the White House's support of their agenda to contain the activities of political and militant Islamists as well as Iran. On the other, the U.S. military has a deep and lasting footprint in Qatar that it will not allow the recent diplomatic row to erase. So, as long as both sides can count on Washington's backing, they can afford to remain steadfast in their positions, underscoring the futility of the White House's attempts to form members of the discordant GCC into an "Arab NATO" capable of managing Iran and neutralizing the jihadist threat.
Turkey, which shares Qatar's support for Islamist groups across the region, will stand by its side in its quarrel with the GCC. In doing so, it will reveal the deep rift between Sunni powers that view Islamists as an existential threat and those that see such groups as an integral segment of Middle Eastern society. For Ankara, the timing of the tiff couldn't be better: After all, it offers Turkey a means of extending its influence in the Gulf as its quiet rivalry with Iran intensifies in Syria and Iraq.
Ankara's more visible confrontation with its Sunni peers, however, will spur Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to ramp up their own involvement in the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts in hopes of balancing against Turkey and Iran. And as Qatar turns to Turkey, Iran and Russia for diplomatic and logistical assistance in its dispute with the GCC, Saudi Arabia will become even more convinced of the need to hold a hard line on Doha.
The commercial and diplomatic consequences of the feud will continue to be felt in the third quarter as well. Because Qatar relies on the United Arab Emirates' position as a regional transshipment hub, supply chains that include products shipped over land or by air from Qatar, such as helium, face the risk of severe disruption while the squabble persists. Trade of oil and liquefied natural gas will be less affected, since Qatar owns dedicated facilities for direct export and has the ability to adapt to regional port restrictions (albeit at a steeper cost) on oil and LNG shipments. But Qatar will see its financial sector shaken, thanks to the industry's heavy reliance on connections to banking sectors throughout the GCC, especially in the United Arab Emirates. The blow dealt to Qatar Airways by a ban on the use of Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini airspace will also add to the pressure building on Doha to capitulate to the bloc's probable demands.
Chief among those demands are moderating coverage by media outlets like Al Jazeera, severing ties to Islamist groups, and aligning Doha's foreign policy with Riyadh's. Qatar will likely take steps to address the first two items, restraining some independent news organizations while mitigating the presence of Islamist groups within its borders, as it has already discreetly begun doing. But Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may go a step further, requiring that Qatar pull back from its relationship with Iran, expel prominent Islamists and limit its military cooperation with Turkey — a partnership that has unsettled Saudi Arabia in its quest to become the region's leading Sunni power. Doha, of course, does not intend to yield swiftly to any of these demands, which it claims are unfounded. (Not to mention the fact that ties with Iran and Islamist groups are critical to Qatar's economic and foreign policy agendas.) And though external parties such as the United States and Turkey will try to broker a resolution to the conflict, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will work to keep mediation within the GCC family, centering negotiations in Kuwait and Oman.

Two Longtime Rivals Battle by Proxy

As Saudi Arabia uses the White House's backing to try to prop up its leadership role in the region, tension between the kingdom and Iran will grow. The dangers of escalation in their rivalry have already been made clear in battlegrounds across the Middle East this quarter. Iran's ability to equip regional proxies, such as the Houthi rebels that the Saudi-led coalition is fighting in Yemen, continues to cause concern in the kingdom. The same is true of Tehran's influence over local actors in unstable areas nearby, such as Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province and Bahrain, where the Iranian government has offered verbal support for Shiite separatist movements and where Saudi and Bahraini security forces are struggling to identify and arrest militant cells. Riyadh's ongoing security operations in al-Awamiyah's Masoura district, moreover, offer Shiite insurgents in the area a chance to attack Saudi forces. Consequently, the kingdom will remain deeply suspicious of Iran, watching carefully for any attempt by Tehran to stoke unrest in majority-Shiite portions of the Arabian Peninsula — and using its fears as justification to step up its own support for militants targeting Iranian interests.
This blame game will only intensify in the third quarter. Over the past few months, Tehran has leveled unprecedented accusations against Saudi Arabia of fomenting instability within Iran's borders. (For instance, Tehran claimed Riyadh and Washington were involved in the Islamic State's June 7 attacks on the Iranian capital.) The Iranian government will continue to point the finger at Saudi Arabia for any threats to Iranian stability that arise, regardless of whether any evidence exists to support its allegations. The claims being thrown back and forth could lead to an uptick in raids against militant groups that may, in turn, spur further unrest. Hotspots to monitor for signs of this volatile spiral include places Iran has already targeted in counterterrorism raids, such as its northwestern Kurdish regions bordering Iraq; areas in the country's south with large Sunni populations; and the restive southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchistan. In fact, Iran already claims to have proof of Saudi meddling among local militant communities in these regions.
The clash of the two titans will play out on political battlefields as well. As the second quarter came to a close, Lebanese lawmakers approved a new electoral law and extended parliament's term to May 20, 2018. The legislation reduces the number of electoral districts in the country from 26 to 15, a move that concerns Lebanon's smaller parties and demographic groups. Over the next few months, lawmakers will hash out the details of holding parliamentary elections, and Druze, Christian and Sunni leaders will work to ensure that their voices are not lost among the country's Shiite majority. Perhaps the most important consequence of the new bill, however, is that it will limit the ability of any external actor — including Iran and Saudi Arabia — to force its agenda on the Lebanese government.
Of course, Saudi Arabia has not forgotten the challenges it faces at home amid its struggle for dominance in the Middle East at large. In the coming months, Riyadh is expected to announce the location of its highly anticipated initial public offering of the Saudi Arabian Oil Co., as well as the results of an ongoing review of the country's oil reserves. Newly annointed Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, for one, has championed the IPO effort.
Having just jumped ahead in the kingdom's line of succession, sidelining former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in the process, bin Salman has a fresh mandate to double down on his aggressive approach toward Iran and economic reform. The new crown prince now also has the power to exercise greater influence over Saudi Arabia's national security, and he will waste no time in holding Iran responsible for threats to it. Bin Salman will no doubt use his newfound clout to try to cajole the region's Sunni powers into following Saudi Arabia's lead and standing united against Iran. Despite his best efforts, though, countries like Qatar, Lebanon and Egypt will work to avoid being dragged into Riyadh's escalating confrontation with Tehran. Balancing between the two, however, will not be so easy for countries with sizable Shiite and Sunni populations and positive relationships with both powers, such as Pakistan and Iraq.

Iran's Hard-Liners Hem In the President

Much to the relief of its Saudi ally, the United States will keep sanctions in place against Iran's ballistic missile program this quarter while continuing to target individuals and companies linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Both Washington and Tehran will strive to keep the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in place, but the lasting friction between the two will narrow Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's policy options. In the wake of the Islamic State's twin attacks in Tehran on June 7, the IRGC will seize the opportunity to secure more resources and expand its activities overseas. Though recently re-elected,  Rouhani will have a tough time using his renewed mandate to reduce the group's writ, a goal he has tried to pursue before. As a result, the president will not be able to moderate Iran's communications with Saudi Arabia or the United States.
This isn't necessarily unusual for Iran; the country's second-term presidents historically have had trouble asserting their agendas and keeping the IRGC and its hard-line political allies in line. As Rouhani strives to make good on his campaign promises of social and economic reform, the gap between him and the rest of the Iranian government (which is appointed rather than elected) will doubtless widen, and the barriers to reform posed by the IRGC may prove insurmountable.

The Syrian Civil War

Across Iran's western border, the Islamic State has suffered crippling defeats in Iraq and Syria. But the loss of territory in the group's core areas of operation has not eliminated its ability to inspire attacks elsewhere in the world. The Islamic State threat is ever-evolving, as seen with its initial attack in Tehran last quarter. One possible outcome of the incident, however, may be to draw Iran deeper into the fight against the Islamic State in Syria. Tehran's forces, already pushing east in Syria toward Islamic State positions near the Iraqi border, risk coming into conflict with the U.S. troops deployed there.
The United States, for its part, has its sights trained on the Islamic State. With U.S. support, the Syrian Democratic Forces have begun to advance on the strategic city of Raqqa, one of the jihadist group's last strongholds. But in a new twist, the U.S.-led coalition and its rebel allies have found themselves facing off against the Syrian government, backed by Iran and Russia, in a contest to wrest control of the Islamic State's remaining territory from its weakened grasp. Each of the participants in this race to the Iraqi border is driven by different interests, but their shared desire to seize the same stretch of land will pit them against one another, increasing the risk of clashes this quarter.
To the Syrian government, reaching outposts in the far east and northeast is critical to its ambitions of reclaiming control over the country. But its Iranian patron is far more interested in using the push to build a land bridge stretching from Tehran to Damascus and the Mediterranean Sea — a link that would greatly extend Tehran's reach by solidifying logistics and supply lines and enhancing its ability to project force. Russia, too, is deeply involved in the loyalists' three-pronged push toward the Iraqi border, and as the Syrian government's troops draw nearer, they risk disrupting the operations of rebels in the area.
The presence of U.S. allies in eastern Syria has already complicated the loyalists' drive east, and it will continue to do so in the coming quarter. Nevertheless, Washington's partners likely won't be able to prevent their Russian- and Iranian-backed rivals from reaching the border first, and by the end of the year.

The Battle for Mosul

Another important front in the fight against the Islamic State is winding down as well. The battle for the Iraqi city of Mosul as all but over; Iraqi troops have encircled and nearly cleared the last pocket of militants in the town. Once the task is complete, those forces will be freed up to stabilize other parts of the country, including Tal Afar, Hawija, Diyala and Anbar. They will also turn their attention to recaptured territory that has grown restive, such as Tuz Khormatu and Sinjar. Though the Islamic State has been driven from these places, they are home to diverse populations and political figures who are vying for the right to govern them. So far Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has managed to place the issue on the back burner, but the end of the Mosul operation will revive negotiations over it, as well as the deployment of troops to the contested areas. Conversations on these thorny matters will get heated in the months ahead, exacerbating fissures within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and between Arbil and Baghdad.
Because the Islamic State has largely fled Iraqi Kurdistan, local political factions have been able to resume their debate over the semi-autonomous region's future. Near the end of the second quarter, Kurdish politicians announced that an independence referendum would be held on Sept. 25. The Kurds' temporary alignment on the issue has spurred concerned powers to try to derail the vote, especially since it will include the oil-rich province of Kirkuk. Baghdad, for example, will likely try to distract Kurdish leaders from the referendum by forcing the KRG to settle its unresolved energy and territorial disputes with the central Iraqi government.
Meanwhile, other countries with sizable Kurdish populations, such as Turkey and Iran, will use Kurdish factions over which they have influence to interject in the referendum plans. A successful bid for independence in Iraqi Kurdistan, after all, would establish a precedent for other Kurdish groups throughout the Middle East, perhaps even inspiring them to push for their own state. And given the constraints on Turkey's actions in Syria, Ankara will be looking for opportunities in Iraq to shape the region's political and security climate after the Mosul operation has ended. Yet by inserting itself in Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey will strain its relationship with KRG President Massoud Barzani. And all the while, Iran will use its Iraqi and Kurdish allies positioned near Turkish-backed forces to protect its own interests in northern Iraq and spoil Turkey's plans.
Despite this rampant meddling, the Kurdish referendum will not lose its momentum. It will, however, fall prey to infighting among the Kurds' rival factions, resulting either in a vote that Baghdad refuses to recognize or in one that the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party has no intention of upholding. (In some ways, Barzani has championed the referendum to distract his constituents from the KRG's pressing problems and from his illegal stay in office, rather than to secure independence for his people.)
The Iraqi government in Baghdad will undergo its own political changes as coalitions fortify themselves and their support bases ahead of provincial elections in September. Whether or not the vote is actually held on time, though, depends on parliament's approval of a new electoral law. Should that approval fail to materialize, the provincial voting could be combined with parliamentary elections in the first half of 2018. But even in the event of a delay, jockeying among Iraq's political parties will continue throughout the third quarter as each angles to win as many seats in the legislature as it can. So far, powerful Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr is pleased with how the electoral law is shaping up and has begun reaching out to Kurdish and Sunni parties to broaden his popular appeal. If, however, the bill does not pass in its current form, which favors small parties over large ones, al-Sadr may resort to calling crowds of his supporters out into the streets. 

Israel Prepares for a Tense Summer

Across Iraq's western border, Israel has ramped up its activity in Syria. During the second quarter, it launched several airstrikes against arms convoys belonging to Hezbollah, a Lebanese militant group backed by Iran, as they transited southern Syria. The attacks underscore the enduring threat that Syrian and Iranian allies on Israel's northern border pose to its national security.
Israel likewise faces a persistent threat along its southern edge. Israeli officials raised the possibility of a fresh clash with Salafist militants in Gaza after interdicting several small rocket attacks — reportedly conducted by multiple groups — near the border. The lasting (and potentially worsening) feud between Palestinian groups Fatah and Hamas over resources in Gaza may only add fuel to the fire, though neither has the political will to stoke a larger conflict with Israel.
Instead, Hamas has been preoccupied by Qatar's dispute with the GCC, which has threatened the group's operations in Doha. Hamas officials are likely making contingency plans in the event that they are forced to relocate some or all of their activities. Iran may be the solution to the group's problem: After years of frosty relations, Tehran's ties with Hamas have begun to warm, and both have expressed the desire to make sure that trend continues. But Iran is not Hamas' only suitor. Egypt, too, has offered to send electricity supplies to Gaza and relax restrictions at its border crossing with the territory in exchange for security concessions. Hamas will therefore spend the next quarter strategizing how to balance Tehran and Cairo's advances without alienating them both.

The Libyan Civil War

Along a different stretch of the Mediterranean coastline, Libya's three rival governments continue to vie with one another for control of the country. The Government of National Accord (GNA), based in Tripoli and recognized by the United Nations, will work with Khalifa Hifter, field marshal of the Libyan National Army (LNA), and his allies in the eastern House of Representatives to follow the political roadmap they signed earlier this year. (The deal includes a plan to hold elections in the first quarter of 2018.) Deepening divisions within both camps, however, will limit the talks' success, even as Hifter tries to improve his image and soften his stance on the militias supporting the GNA.
Those militias have given the GNA the upper hand in Tripoli since their Misratan adversaries, which are aligned with the General National Congress, retreated last quarter. But the GNA's battle for legitimacy in the strategic city is not won: The Misratan militias are still hovering in certain sections of Tripoli's outskirts. In the meantime, though the LNA will continue to advance to the south and west, Hifter's dearth of ground troops will impede movement beyond the current lines of battle.
The return of stability to much of Libya has enabled the country's oil sector to begin making a slow recovery. Volatility, however, will continue to endanger that revival. In the coming quarter, oil production could drop from its May average of 730,000 barrels per day to as low as 450,000 bpd if one of Libya's many fault lines erupts. That said, an uptick in output (albeit temporary) to between 900,000 and 1,000,000 bpd is also well within the realm of possibility during periods of calm.

2017 Annual Forecast: Middle East and North Africa

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It is tempting to think the Syrian civil war will end this year, but that is not the case.
The United States will be no less engaged with the Middle East in 2017 than it was in 2016. It will, however, be more judicious in its engagement, giving other countries an opening to compete for influence. The competition will play out primarily in and around the Syria-Iraq battlefield, which will continue to implicate its neighbors and countries much farther afield. Developments in the fights inside Syria and Iraq will aggravate sectarian tensions and intensify the ongoing rivalry between Turkey and Iran.

Resisting the Temptation About Syria

It is tempting to think the Syrian civil war will end in 2017, now that the forces loyal to Bashar al Assad have retaken the critical city of Aleppo. Indeed, they now control a few major cities and have the luxury of consolidating the gains they have made. But the conflict will not end, at least not in 2017. The loyalists are simply pulled in too many directions to achieve a decisive victory. In addition to holding their territory in the north, they must now try to clear the rebels located between Aleppo and Damascus and around Damascus itself. They will also be drawn to areas held by the Islamic State in the eastern city of Deir el-Zour, where their comrades are currently besieged. Retaking territory in the energy belt around Palmyra will be a priority too. Put differently, there is still a lot work left for them to do, and any number of things can shift the balance of power in such a conflict-ridden country.

The constraints on the loyalists, however, are but one factor preventing the conflict's resolution. In 2017, the presence of foreign powers will also complicate the Syrian battlefield, much as it has in years past. The United States will adapt its strategy in Syria, favoring one that more selectively aids specific groups in the fight against the Islamic State rather than those fighting the al Assad government. Washington will, for example, continue to back Kurdish forces but will curb support for rebels in Idlib. The consequences of which will be threefold. First, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia will have to increase their support for the rebels, including the more radical ones, the United States has forsaken. Second, their support will give radical elements room to thrive, as will the reduced oversight associated with Washington's disengagement. Third, Russia will be able to cooperate more tactically with the United States and its allies as it tries to exact concessions, including the easing of sanctions, in a broader negotiation with Washington.
Notably, Russia will cooperate only insofar as it helps Moscow achieves those goals, but given Moscow's limited influence on the ground in Syria, there is only so much it can actually do. Still, that will not stop Russia from trying to replace Washington as the primary arbiter of Syrian negotiation.
While other powers are preoccupied with the fight against the Islamic State, Turkey will expand its sphere of influence in northern Syria and Iraq, driven as it is by its imperative to block Kurdish expansion. In Syria, the presence of Russian troops will probably prevent Turkey from venturing any farther south than al Bab in northern Aleppo. From al Bab, Turkey will try to drive eastward toward the town of Manbij to divide and thus weaken areas held by the Kurds. Turkey will also lobby for a bigger role in anti-Islamic State operations in Raqqa. Turkey will deploy more of its own forces in the Syrian fight, both to obstruct the expansion of Syrian Kurdish forces and degrade the Islamic State.
There are, of course, some drawbacks to Turkey's strategy. Namely, it runs the risk of clashes with Russian and Syrian Kurdish forces. Ankara will thus have to concentrate on maintaining closer ties with Moscow to avoid complications on the battlefield, even as it manages tensions with the United States over Washington's continued support for the Kurds.
In Iraq, too, Turkey will extend its influence in the north – notably, to where the Ottoman Empire's border was once drawn through Sinjar, Mosul, Arbil and Kirkuk. And as it does, it will compete with Iran for influence in the power vacuum left by the Islamic State's defeat in Mosul. Baghdad, for its part, will struggle to control Nineveh province once the Islamic State loses Mosul. Meanwhile, Turkey will bolster its proxies to position itself as the patron state of the region's Sunnis.
Turkey's resurgence threatens Iran's arc of influence across northern Syria and Iraq, and Tehran has plenty of ways it can respond. The government will encourage Shiites in Baghdad to resist what they will characterize as a Turkish occupation. It will also rely on Shiite militias to block Ankara by contesting territory and exploiting divisions among Iraqi Kurds. Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council, who have comparatively less influence Iraq, will rely on Turkey to uphold Sunni interests.
The fall of Mosul will further divide Iraq's Kurds. The inevitable scramble for territory and influence will pit the Turkey-backed Kurdistan Democratic Party against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which is more closely aligned with Iran. Kirkuk, a city and province awash in oil, will be particularly contentious. The KDP will try to keep what it has gained there, while Baghdad, backed by Iran, will try to take it back. This will impede sustainable cooperation in energy production and revenue-sharing operations between Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan.

Turkey: No Shortage of Challenges

For all of Turkey's challenges abroad, it has no shortage of them at home. Kurdish militant attacks are a perennial problem, of course, and Ankara's role in strangling Islamic State escape routes in Syria will meanwhile make it a prime target for attacks in 2017. But perhaps more important, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will hold a referendum in 2017 on constitutional amendments meant to strengthen the presidency under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The AKP has still has substantial support despite a highly polarized electorate, but the economy it helms is shaky. Turkey's dollar-denominated debt will grow as the dollar strengthens, and the lira's instability will spook investors, who are already alarmed about the country's political crackdowns. Those crackdowns will also complicate Turkey's EU accession talks. Not that Turkey expected to make much progress in that regard; it simply needs to keep the dialogue going over migrant controls to keep a foothold in the West and to maintain market access to the European Union.

A Test for U.S.-Iran Relations

2017 will test the durability of U.S.-Iranian relations. The new U.S. government is expected to be less tolerant of what it sees as Iranian aggression — naval harassment and ballistic missile testing, for example — even if it does not directly infringe on the nuclear deal. Strong U.S. responses to such aggression would, from Iran's point of view, be a violation of the agreement, but Iran can be expected to challenge the agreement only if the United States does first. (Russia stands to benefit from U.S.-Iranian tensions. In its search for additional leverage against the United States, it will tighten its relationship with Iran through economic and military deals, knowing that Tehran will use Russia to balance against Washington as the questions emerge about the nuclear deal's viability.)
Still, the Iran deal will survive the year, despite U.S. threats to the contrary. For all the heated rhetoric surrounding U.S.-Iranian relations, Washington has little interest in becoming mired in further Middle East conflicts, least of which with Iran. Likewise, Iran needs to boost its economy, something it will not be able to do without the foreign trade, investment and interaction the nuclear deal allows.
The Iranian economy, in fact, will be perhaps the determining factor in the presidential election, scheduled to take place in May. President Hassan Rouhani, a moderate by Iran's standards, will try to argue that the partial removal of sanctions and the stabilization of the inflation rate will benefit ordinary Iranians. His hard-line opponents in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps accuse him of being soft on the United States, however, and conceding too much control of the economy to international parties.
Regardless of the election's outcome, Iran will remain under the influence of conservative politicians. And these politicians are beholden to the supreme leader, who distrusts the United States but also understands the need to re-enter the global economy. The gradual increase of oil production will help in that regard, but questions surrounding the sustainability of the Iran nuclear deal, not to mention the direction of U.S. policy, could prevent Iran from achieving its economic goals.

The Path to Gulf Reform

Saudi Arabia will relish the deterioration of U.S.-Iran relations. And, like Turkey, it will be driven to bolster its regional proxy battles with Iran. However, Riyadh will have to weigh expensive foreign campaigns against mounting pressures at home. After slashing capital expenditures and trimming its public sector bill in 2016, Saudi Arabia will be able to reduce its budget deficit in 2017. Still, the path to reform has been slow and bumpy, and it will be difficult for Saudi Arabia to translate its ambitious Vision 2030 and Vision 2020 plans into tangible directives its struggling private sector can follow. With more than four times more money set aside this year than last for implementing Vision 2020 directives, Saudi leaders will pressure the public and private sector to begin shifting operations accordingly and create more jobs.
Meanwhile, Riyadh will prepare for Saudi Aramco's initial public offering, which will take place in 2018, and will broaden the scope of its Public Investment Fund to adopt riskier investments abroad in a bid to turn its wealth repository into a true sovereign wealth fund. Mimicking countries like Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia will continue to diversify its overseas investments into various tech sectors — a tried and true way to generate revenue in the long term. The United Arab Emirates will lead a Gulf-wide initiative and put technical preparations in place to set up a standard value-added tax levied at 5 percent. The initiative is slated to kick off in early 2018.
Saudi citizens will clamor for change as the drive toward reform presses on, but the government will prioritize the economy over social reform. Even a modest social reform risks alienating the Saudi religious establishment, whose support for the House of Saud will need to manage homegrown jihadist threats.
The rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council will act in concert to curb Iranian influence and defend against common economic and security threats. But there are cracks in the façade of unity. Saudi Arabia will struggle to steer Yemen toward a negotiated settlement while the United Arab Emirates firms up its position in southern Yemen. Oman, known for its relative neutrality, will not participate in the GCC's antagonizing of Iran.

North Africa

These same dynamics will appear in the GCC's foreign policy in North Africa. Saudi Arabia will continue to give its allies economic and security support in exchange for their support of its foreign policy in places like Yemen and Syria. The United Arab Emirates will be a more moderate voice, however, and in its moderation it will undermine the credibility of Saudi Arabia.
Egypt will be economically stable enough in 2017 to formulate a foreign policy independent of Saudi interests. To that end, it will try to attract funding from as many external partners as possible. Now that Cairo has devalued its currency, agreed to a deal with the International Monetary Fund and enacted more fuel subsidy reforms, it must implement more fundamental, structural reform, such as reducing public sector wages and raising tax revenue. The government of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will be only modestly successful in that regard, hamstrung as it is by the legislature and the people, who bear the brunt of the country's economic malaise.
Egypt will meanwhile remain involved in Libya, where Egyptian and Emirati support for nationalist Gen. Khalifa Hifter, who commands the Libyan National Army, is beginning to pay off. Hifter will be able to strengthen his military and political control in eastern Libya and will expand his control into Western Libya, but he will be unable to do so entirely. The Libyan National Army will try to rally militias to its cause, but not all of them will want to fight for Hifter. Regardless, Hifter's divisiveness is bound to impede U.N.-led negotiations to form and approve a unity government. And so Libya will continue to be a battlespace among rival militias that will limit the potential for a lasting peace deal in 2017. Whoever wins this competition will win Libya's oil wealth.
The Islamic State, meanwhile, will lose a lot of its power but will find refuge and allies in the far reaches of Libya. At the same time, al Qaeda-linked militias will continue to quietly expand their influence.

The State of the Islamic State

The Islamic State will lose power elsewhere too. Military campaigns in Iraq and Syria will degrade the group as a conventional military force but will do little to degrade it as terrorist or insurgent force. Dispersed throughout the areas they once controlled, remnants of the Islamic State will remain relevant by exploiting ethnic and sectarian divisions throughout Iraq and Syria. Terrorist attacks will therefore return to Iraq in spectacular form. (Despite the military setbacks in Iraq, the Islamic State will have a little more latitude to operate in Syria, where the coalition effort to fight Islamic State is far more convoluted.)
Islamic State attacks abroad, however, will be a much more limited threat. Militants returning home from Iraq and Syria are certainly a risk for Western countries, but they are a risk that will be mitigated by heightened awareness and intelligence oversight and increased risk of interdiction. More resourceful grassroots terrorists that do not have to rely on extensive networks and capabilities will be the bigger threat from Islamic State in 2017, especially for the West.
While the Islamic State has commanded the attention of the international community, al Qaeda has been quietly rebuilding itself, honing its capabilities in multiple theaters to stage its comeback. Al Qaeda nodes that have restyled themselves under various names in Libya, Algeria, Mali, Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen are likely to become more active and influential. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is particularly concerning. The tacit agreement it had with Saudi Arabia in Yemen has broken down, making the kingdom a viable target for the jihadist group.
Jihadists will remain active elsewhere, too, though their attacks will be relatively unsophisticated. If attacks become more complex in places like Indonesia and Bangladesh, it means more experienced fighters in the Middle East successfully found their way back home.
In Nigeria, Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi, better known by its former name, Boko Haram, will continue to adopt al Qaeda's targeting strategy, which focuses on military and Western targets while refraining from attacking civilians and Muslims. The faction of the group under the leadership of Abubaker Shekau, however, will continue to attack mosques, Muslims, markets, civilians and other soft targets.

Israel Emboldened

2017 will present Israel with a variety of opportunities, the biggest of which will come from its security guarantor, the United States. With Republicans firmly in control of the executive and legislative branches of government in the U.S., Israel will have freer rein to pursue its interests without rebuke. The country will benefit from a more assertive U.S. policy on Iran, and through Washington may try to place even more restrictions on Iranian uranium enrichment — after all, the new U.S. administration is liable to be more receptive to intelligence collected on Iran, especially if it points to infractions of the nuclear deal. An emboldened Israel will also probably accelerate settlement development in the West Bank, even if doing so incites attacks from Palestinian militants. An escalation in Israeli-Palestinian frictions will stress Israel's relationships with Jordan and Egypt, both facing internal stresses of their own. (The Palestinian issue will also notably be a source of competition between Turkey and Egypt. Ankara will try to develop better relations with Palestinian groups while managing a normalized but still tense relationship with Israel.)
But 2017 will also present Israel with a variety of challenges. To its north, it will have to contend with Hezbollah, arguably more powerful and experienced than it has been in years thanks to its heavy participation in the Syrian civil war. But Hezbollah has its hands full. It will consolidate territory in Syria for regime loyalists, it will fend off political challenges in Lebanon and it will meanwhile keep its eye on Israel. Worried about Hezbollah's military strength, cognizant that it will have a window of opportunity, and unencumbered by Washington's reproach, Israel is likely to intensify its operations in Syria and Lebanon in an attempt to weaken Hezbollah and limit their access to advanced weaponry.

2017 Second-Quarter Forecast: Middle East and North Africa

In the Middle East and North Africa, the primary focus of the second quarter will be the fight against the Islamic State.

[url=https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/2017-second-quarter-forecast-middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-and-north-africa#The Syrian Civil War]The Syrian Civil War[/url]
[url=https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/2017-second-quarter-forecast-middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-and-north-africa#The Fight Against the Islamic State]The Fight Against the Islamic State[/url]
[url=https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/2017-second-quarter-forecast-middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-and-north-africa#The Battle for Mosul]The Battle for Mosul[/url]
[url=https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/2017-second-quarter-forecast-middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-and-north-africa#The Kurdish Struggle]The Kurdish Struggle[/url]
[url=https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/2017-second-quarter-forecast-middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-and-north-africa#Turkey%27s Resurgence]Turkey's Resurgence[/url]
[url=https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/2017-second-quarter-forecast-middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-and-north-africa#Iran%27s Arc of Influence]Iran's Arc of Influence[/url]
[url=https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/2017-second-quarter-forecast-middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-and-north-africa#Israel%27s Survival Strategy]Israel's Survival Strategy[/url]
[url=https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/2017-second-quarter-forecast-middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-and-north-africa#The Saudi Survival Strategy]The Saudi Survival Strategy[/url]
[url=https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/2017-second-quarter-forecast-middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-and-north-africa#The Yemeni Civil War]The Yemeni Civil War[/url]
[url=https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/2017-second-quarter-forecast-middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-and-north-africa#The Libyan Civil War]The Libyan Civil War[/url]
[url=https://www.stratfor.com/forecast/2017-second-quarter-forecast-middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east-and-north-africa#The Difficulties of North African Reform]The Difficulties of North African Reform[/url]

The Syrian Civil War

The United States faces heightened risk on the Syrian battlefield this quarter at the same time it prepares to kick off a major offensive against Islamic State in Raqqa. A U.S. limited strike on a Syrian air base in response to a Syrian chemical weapons attack was designed to demonstrate the United States’ decisiveness in military matters (a message not lost on North Korea,) but it also came with risks. Russia has long attempted to leverage the Syrian battlefield in its broader negotiations with the United States, but the United States is not leaving much room for a bargain with Moscow. Russia thus has to rely on negative influence to try and draw the United States into a dialogue and will try to play the role of spoiler on the Syrian battlefield to raise operational risks for the United States. There will be potential for the two sides to negotiate on deconfliction, but that will likely be the extent of their cooperation this quarter as Washington focuses on the fight against the Islamic State.
Russian forces will be active elsewhere in Syria, however, supporting the Syrian army's offensives against rebel forces as well as the Islamic State in theaters such as Deir el-Zour. After a few shaky months in place, the cease-fire that Russia, Turkey and Iran brokered between the rebels and loyalists in December 2016 has broken down completely. Its failure underscores the futility of the attempted peace talks that took place throughout the first quarter. In the second quarter, Syria's deepening economic woes, evident in the country's food shortages and collapsing currency, will threaten the government's hold on loyalist territory. 
Syrian fighters backed by the United States will lead the charge in Raqqa. The United States' battle plan, which also includes deployments of U.S. troops, will rely on the most effective fighting force available in the short term: the multiethnic Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF has made swift work of the fight so far, having nearly encircled the city. With help from the freshly deployed U.S. forces, artillery support has also been put in place.
But by emphasizing the SDF in the battle for Raqqa, the United States will further strain its already tense relations with Turkey. The forces include members of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), a militia Turkey considers a terrorist organization and an active threat to its national security. Still, Ankara's dismay will not discourage Washington from working with the force. And though Turkey will try to finagle a more prominent role for the forces it supports, including Turkish-trained Arab tribal forces, the United States will prioritize winning the fight against the Islamic State by the most expedient means available over appeasing Turkey. Turkey will nonetheless try to draw the United States deeper in a fight against the Syrian regime and push its proposals for establishing a no fly one and safe zones in in Syria. 

Washington's battle plan for Raqqa is just one of many complications Ankara will have to contend with in Syria in the second quarter. By the time Turkey took al-Bab from the Islamic State during the last quarter, it had already accomplished many of its objectives in northern Syria under Operation Euphrates Shield. But its efforts to keep Kurdish forces from establishing control over a contiguous swath of territory in the northern part of the country are still in progress. To achieve that objective, it will have to tread lightly so as not to step on Russia's toes. Ankara and Moscow's alliance of convenience has mostly run its course in Syria, especially since Russia foiled Turkey's plans to take the city of Manbij. Nevertheless, the two countries need to keep the lines of communication open to ensure that their troops don't end up in conflict. If their priorities in Syria continue diverging, Turkey may start looking for other ways to gain leverage over Russia — by joining in on negotiations over the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, for instance, or increasing its coordination with fellow NATO members in the Black Sea. And even though Turkey will have less room to maneuver in Syria this quarter, it will still have some leeway to deepen its involvement in northern Iraq.

The Fight Against the Islamic State

In the Middle East and North Africa, the primary focus of the second quarter will be the fight against the Islamic State. The battle to oust the extremist group from its strongholds in the region will reach milestones in multiple theaters in the months ahead. in Iraq, for instance, the battle for Mosul will come to a close, at least in the city itself. And in Syria, the operation to reclaim the city of Raqqa is about to get underway. These events, though notable, will hardly herald the demise of the Islamic State. In fact, the organization will redouble its terrorist activities, not only in its core area of operations in the Middle East but also internationally, in an attempt to maintain its relevance as it loses territory.

The Battle for Mosul

Five months into the fighting, the end of the Mosul offensive is now in sight. Before the operation ends, though, Iraqi forces will deploy to other Islamic State strongholds such as Tal Afar and Hawija to sweep the extremist group out of those pockets. As the main battle comes to a close, the divisions among the Iraqi coalition's constituent groups will become clearer than ever. The risk of infighting among the alliance's Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni militias will be high throughout the quarter, particularly in the northern border regions of Nineveh province.
That Iraqi army forces are engaged in fighting in the city itself has improved the central government's reputation among Mosul residents; the boost will help Baghdad gain legitimacy and establish its authority over the city. But stabilizing the reclaimed territories around the city will be a tall order for Baghdad. Rifts within Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish groups will prevent them from reaching a coherent political settlement over Nineveh province's future this quarter. Iran and Turkey, meanwhile, will continue to vie for influence in Iraq, primarily through proxy battles in the disputed territories that will soon be reclaimed from the Islamic State. The Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) each claim control of Tal Afar, Kirkuk and Sinjar, making these areas most susceptible to fighting and disputes over territory and resources.
As Iraq's political parties gear up for provincial elections in September, regional powers such as Turkey and Iran will have yet another opportunity to try to gain influence in the country. Tehran will use its sway among Iraq's Shiite political parties and militias to goad Baghdad to prioritize its ties with Iran and to block Ankara's attempts to get involved in the political settlement process through Sunni parties. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi will face mounting political pressure from all sides, including Iraq's nationalist parties, as he tries to appease Turkey, Iran and the West simultaneously. Adding to the mix, Saudi Arabia will make economic and diplomatic gestures in an effort to strengthen its ties with Baghdad. (U.S. President Donald Trump's administration has been pressuring the kingdom to help loosen Iran's grip on Baghdad's political and security spheres.)  

The Kurdish Struggle

In Iraqi Kurdistan, disagreements will prevent the region's various political factions from forming a united front. In fact, the divisions are widening. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has started pushing back more forcefully against its main political rival, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to increase its share of oil revenues from Kirkuk and weaken the KDP's alliance with Baghdad. The dispute is good news for Baghdad, at least. Should the PUK make another attempt at disrupting the flow of oil from Kirkuk to win concessions from Baghdad or Arbil, the Iraqi government will feel less threatened than it would if the KDP were also in on the plan. But Kirkuk could become a flashpoint this quarter regardless, as the governments in Baghdad and the KRG, not to mention the rival Kurdish parties, fight over control of the province and its oil production.
Iraqi Kurdistan, similarly, will be a primary playing field in the competition between Turkey and Iran. Ankara will use the presence of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which it considers a terrorist organization, in northern Iraq as a pretext to deploy proxy forces in the region to defend its interests there. Turkey might consider, for instance, dispatching the Rojava Peshmerga, a Kurdish militia aligned with the KDP, to fight on its behalf in the event that ethnic conflict flares up after the Mosul offensive winds down. To keep Ankara in check and support its own interests in northern Iraq, Tehran will rely on the mostly Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces positioned near Turkish-backed forces, as well as its ties with Baghdad.

Turkey's Resurgence

In Turkey, voters will head to the polls in mid-April to decide whether to go ahead with proposed constitutional amendments that could change Turkey's political future. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has a lot riding on the success of the reforms, which would increase the powers of the presidency and curtail those of other branches of government. But when voters cast their ballots on April 16, they will have other concerns on their minds, such as the country's flagging economy. Turkey's high dollar-denominated debt and weakening currency — set to further deteriorate as the dollar strengthens — have exacerbated its financial troubles recently. If the referendum falls short of the simple majority it needs to pass, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will still retain power, though the loss would be a blow for Erdogan's campaign to consolidate institutional control.

To try to improve its chances of success, the AKP has been using the country's security concerns to stoke nationalism and stir popular support for the referendum. The wave of nationalism sweeping Turkey will buoy the ruling party, win or lose. Nevertheless, the results of the referendum will reveal strong support for and opposition to the AKP, laying bare the country's sharp political divisions.

Iran's Arc of Influence

Iran will also hold an important vote this quarter. Voters in the country will elect their next president May 19. As the election approaches, even the Islamic republic's hard-line politicians are trying to avoid instigating conflict with the United States. Washington, likewise, will be careful not to provoke hostilities with Tehran by changing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal — especially since the GCC countries support keeping the agreement in place rather than risking uncertainty by scrapping it. But that won't stop the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from keeping up its usual defensive posturing and staging missile tests or military exercises in a bid to stay relevant. And as U.S. lawmakers have made clear, Congress will not hesitate to impose additional sanctions against Tehran in response to any perceived aggression.
The threat of new sanctions from the United States will compound Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's economic worries in the runup to the elections. When campaign season kicks off in April, the incumbent leader will face challenges from opponents in Iran's hard-line and conservative camps alike. And though Rouhani has experience, momentum and his role in Iran's economic recovery to date on his side, the country's lingering financial troubles will weigh heavy on voters' minds as they head for the ballot box. Inflation has fallen under Rouhani's administration, but unemployment is still high — a vulnerability his opponents may seize on during the campaign.

As the Islamic republic gears up for its election, one of its prized proxy forces, Hezbollah, could derail a vote in Lebanon. The militia's allies and enemies are still at odds over electoral reforms and a new budget, and their disagreements could postpone elections set for May. Notwithstanding the current dispute, the Lebanese government has come a long way over the past several months. A new prime minister and president have managed to reshuffle the country's military leadership and, more important, revive its stagnant energy sector. Their progress highlights the pragmatic approach Lebanon's main political parties have taken to try to find a viable compromise to solve the country's persistent problems. But as the lingering differences over electoral reform demonstrate, no solution is perfect.
Hezbollah will also be a source of growing concern for Israel during the second quarter. The group's military buildup in Syria over the course of the civil war there, combined with its growing presence in the Golan Heights, has put Israel on high alert and fueled fears of an impending war at the country's northern border. To prevent Hezbollah from getting any stronger, the Israeli government will continue attacking its arms shipments in southern Syria. Nevertheless, the conflict could escalate during the second quarter.

Israel's Survival Strategy

If the Israeli government keeps pursuing its settlement policy in the West Bank without objection from the White House, moreover, the proliferating communities could provoke a violent response from Palestinians there. The risk of renewed conflict, sparked by competing Salafist groups or merely by chance events, will loom large in the Palestinian Authority, though its two main political parties, Fatah and Hamas, will each try to avoid confrontation with Israel this quarter. In addition, the political divides between the parties could further postpone legislative elections in the Palestinian territories, scheduled in the West Bank for May.
Hamas and Fatah will each be focused on their own internal objectives this quarter rather than on bridging the divide between them. Hamas is working to modify its political charter for the first time in decades, breaking with tradition to recognize the 1967 Palestinian borders. The party's turn toward moderation, however slight, is meant to curry favor with Arab partners such as Egypt, whose support Hamas needs more than ever now that the Islamic State's Sinai faction is threatening its supply routes and legitimacy. (Israel will put little stock in the group's efforts at change, though, and will continue its operations against Hamas.) Fatah's leaders, meanwhile, will be focused on establishing a succession plan for aging party leader and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The enduring rifts between the rival Palestinian parties will prompt Arab states in the region to get more involved to try to resolve the struggle.

The Saudi Survival Strategy

For Saudi Arabia, the second quarter will hinge on OPEC's May 25 meeting. The summit, during which Riyadh will cajole its fellow members in the oil cartel to extend the production cut instated in November 2016, will be a turning point for the Saudi government's economic reform initiatives. Even though the production cap hasn't boosted oil prices as much as Riyadh hoped it would, the kingdom is in no position to risk oversaturating the market by scrapping the deal. Doing so, after all, would further destabilize the price of oil, jeopardizing Saudi Arabia's oil revenues in the process. Whether the country can persuade the rest of OPEC to stay the course with the production cut will determine every other economic action that the Saudi government takes for the rest of the year.

The Yemeni Civil War

With all sides of the conflict locked in a stalemate, Yemen's civil war will enter the second quarter more or less stagnant. The rifts in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) military coalition against Yemen's Houthi rebels are more pronounced than ever. The United Arab Emirates is focused on training and supporting its own forces in the south. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is looking to the United States for help negotiating a political resolution to end the fight. But until Riyadh compromises in its adamant support for Yemeni President Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi, and the Houthi rebels agree to relinquish territory to the government, the prospects for peace will be slim. So though the United Nations will make another attempt at forging a peace plan for the country, it will make little headway in this endeavor.
Evidence of Iran's efforts to train and equip the Houthi rebels, meanwhile, has prompted the Pentagon to request more support for the Saudi- and Emirati-led coalition. If the White House approves, the United States will share more intelligence and boost its logistical coordination with the Gulf coalition to try to limit Iran's influence in war-torn Yemen and stabilize the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait. At the same time, Washington will pursue a more aggressive strategy against al Qaeda in the second quarter since the group's slow and steady approach has enabled it to grow in Yemen as well as Syria.

The Libyan Civil War

Oil production will also play an important role in Libya this quarter, as multiple conflicts rage on in the country. Libyan National Army chief Field Marshal Khalifa Hifter has reclaimed the critical As Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil export terminals in eastern Libya, after the Petroleum Facilities Guards and Benghazi Defense Brigades militias overran them in early March. Though the fighting stalled oil production in Libya, it will likely maintain export levels over 400,000 barrels per day throughout the quarter.
In western Libya, meanwhile, rivalries between the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord and the General National Congress, two of the country's three rival governments, will breed divisions in Misrata and Tripoli. Outbreaks of violence between the governments' corresponding militias will continue to be a constant this quarter, particularly in the capital. International support for Libya's governments will be less divided, by contrast. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates will continue to back Hifter, while Russia increases its support for his Libyan National Army. (Unless he can bring more ground forces under his control, however, Hifter will have trouble increasing his influence in eastern Libya, and his efforts to draw new recruits will run up against tribal divisions.) And although the European Union will push for political resolutions to the various battles in Libya, negotiations will stay at a standstill this quarter.

The Difficulties of North African Reform

Elsewhere in North Africa, Algeria's government will fight a political battle of its own this quarter, albeit more quietly. The country's citizens are frustrated since the government passed a new budget that slashed public spending and raised taxes. The austerity measures, which sparked public protests, will be at the forefront of voters' minds as they head to the polls in May for legislative elections, and more demonstrations are expected in the meantime. Whatever the vote's outcome, however, the Parliament lacks the political clout to bring change to Algeria's tightly controlled political system, even if opposition parties perform better than they have in years past. Many of President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika's close allies have ensconced themselves in important ministries and positions over the past few years, including, during the first quarter, the head of state oil and gas company Sonatrach. Infighting among the country's elite will be a strong undercurrent in Algerian politics for the rest of the quarter, though it will take place largely behind closed doors.